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I. Introduction
It is well documented that firms differ in productivity within even nar-
rowly defined industries.1 Moreover, across countries, the extent of this
dispersion varies considerably, particularly when comparing countries
at different stages of economic development. Dispersion is also observed
in the marginal revenue products of inputs, particularly capital. Viewed
through a standard static model of production and demand, variation in
marginal products across firms suggests the existence of frictions that
prevent the efficient allocation of resources in an industry, or an econ-
omy at large.
Mirroring this observation, quantitative studies find that reallocation
of capital to more productive uses has important implications for aggre-
gate productivity and welfare, within industries, countries, and over time
ðsee, e.g., Olley and Pakes 1996; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Bartelsman
et al. 2013; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, forthcomingÞ. Spurred by
this set of facts, a number of recent papers have tried to identify specific
mechanisms to explain why productivity differences are not eliminated
by market-based resource reallocation.2
This paper investigates the role of dynamically chosen inputs, such as
capital, in shaping the dispersion of the marginal product of inputs. Spe-
cifically, we consider a variant of a standard dynamic investment model in
which firms ðaÞ face costs when adjusting one factor of production ðcap-
italÞ, ðbÞ can acquire all inputs in a frictionless spot market, and ðcÞ get a
firm-specific productivity shock ðmeasured using revenue total factor pro-
ductivity, or TFPRÞ in each period generated by an ARð1Þ process.3 Thus,
a capital stock determined in some previous period may no longer ap-
pear to be optimal after a productivity shock hits. As a result, dispersion in
the marginal revenue product of capital arises naturally.4 A literal impli-
cation is that resource allocation, while appearing inefficient in a static
setting, may well be efficient in a dynamic sense.5
1 We define our measure of productivity, TFPR, below and discuss its measurement in
detail. For recent work, see Bartelsman and Doms ð2000Þ, Syverson ð2011Þ, Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta ð2013Þ, and references therein.
2 See Restuccia and Rogerson ð2008Þ, Collard-Wexler ð2009Þ, Hsieh and Klenow ð2009Þ,
Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma ð2012Þ, Moll ð2012Þ, Peters ð2012Þ, and Midrigan and Xu
ð2014Þ for recent work.
3 Throughout the paper, in discussing our own work, we consider productivity to be
TFPR and use the terms interchangeably.
4 We focus on themarginal revenue product of capital as this seems to be the input that is
most prone to adjustment costs. This is consistent with data, as we discuss in Sec. IV.C: we
observe more dispersion in the marginal product of capital relative to that of other inputs.
5 The validity of this literal interpretation rests on the relationship between the TFPR
process and policy. Whether this process in amenable to policy adjustment is a question we
turn to in the conclusion.
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We then evaluate the empirical value of this model, employing two
types of data: The first is country-specific data, which we will refer to as
tier 1 data, on establishment/firm production in manufacturing in each
of the United States, Chile, France, India, Mexico, Romania, Slovenia,
and Spain ðall of which have been widely used in the development and
productivity literaturesÞ. The second data, which we call tier 2, are from
the World Bank Enterprise Survey ðWBESÞ; they allow us to exploit pro-
duction data on firms in 33 countries.6 Each type of data has different
strengths: the country-specific data sets have many more observations
and tighter data collection protocols, while the WBES data allow us to
access a broader set of countries.
The basic reduced-form pattern implied by the model—that as the
volatility of TFPR increases, so does the dispersion of marginal product
of capital—is strongly supported by data. It is supported both across in-
dustries within a country ðusing the tier 1 dataÞ and across countries ðus-
ing the tier 2 dataÞ.
After documenting this basic reduced-form pattern, we take a more
structural approach to see how well the model captures cross-industry var-
iation in dispersion. For this exercise, we first estimate capital adjustment
costs. These adjustment cost estimates, along with an ðindustry-country
specificÞARð1Þ shockprocess, are used to generatemodel predictions ði.e.,
we hold all other parameters constantÞ. We then confront the model pre-
dictions with the data.
We make three specific contributions in this paper: First, we show that
the model of dynamic inputs can quantitatively replicate dispersion of
the marginal revenue product of capital that is found in the data. This in-
dicates that the model of dynamically chosen inputs provides a natural
benchmark for the dispersion of marginal revenue products in an undis-
torted economy. Indeed the literature onmisallocation acknowledges that
dispersion of marginal revenue products alone is not evidence of misal-
location and that adjustment costs may play an important role ðsee, e.g.,
Hsieh and Klenow 2009Þ.
Second, we find meaningful differences in the size of TFPR shocks
across industries within countries, as well as across countries, of the same
relative magnitude as differences in the cross-sectional dispersion of the
marginal revenue product of capital.Moreover, industries ðcountriesÞwith
the greatest volatility of TFPR also have the greatest dispersion of the
marginal revenue product of capital. These reduced-form results are ro-
bust to a wide range of measurement and model specification concerns,
such as alternative specifications of the TFPR process and alternative
6 The WBES data cover firms in the manufacturing, construction, services, transport,
storage, and communications sectors.
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measures of volatility; these results hold both across industries within a
country and across countries.
Third, we show that a structural implementation of this model can
capture, both qualitatively and quantitatively, much of the cross-industry
ðcountryÞ variation in the dispersion of marginal revenue products of
capital. The model performs strongly: when confronted with industry-
country data on dispersion in the marginal revenue product of capital,
it generates a measure of fit equivalent to an uncentered R2 of around
.8–.9, depending on the specification. Our results indicate that, perhaps
surprisingly, the exact level of adjustment costs does not change this mea-
sure of fit greatly: whether we rely on the US estimated adjustment costs
or a country-specific one, the measure of fit is about the same. The ab-
sence of adjustment costs, with all other parts of the model held fixed,
leads to a drop in our measure of fit, which suggests that adjustment cost
and volatility play an important role in shaping differences in the dis-
persion of marginal revenue product of capital ðacross industries and
countriesÞ and, as a consequence, are crucial to understanding income
differences across countries.
Taken as a whole, these results highlight the importance of dynamic
inputs in explaining, in both levels and differences, the dispersion of
the marginal product of capital. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that
producer-level volatility may be an important factor in explaining aggre-
gate welfare. The productivity process we employ is a reduced form for a
range of time-varying shocks to production, including ðbut not limited
toÞ demand shocks, natural disasters, infrastructure shocks, variation in
the incidence of corruption or nepotism, changes in markups due to de-
mand shocks or market structure changes, and changes to informational
barriers. This paper suggests a channel through which thesemicro effects
can have aggregate implications.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
present our dynamic model of investment. Section III presents the data
and discusses the measurement of productivity across several countries.
We turn to reduced-form empirical evidence and subject it to a variety of
robustness checks in Section IV. Section V confronts the predictions of
the dynamic investment model with the data using a structural approach.
In Section VI, we consider cross-country variation using the WBES data.
Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings in Sec-
tion VII.
7 For micro-based studies that consider the effect of each, see Collard-Wexler ð2013Þ on de-
mand shocks; De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff ð2012Þ on natural disasters; Fisher-Vanden,
Mansur, and Wang ð2012Þ on infrastructure; Fisman and Svensson ð2007Þ on corruption;
De Loecker et al. ð2012Þ on markups; and Bloom et al. ð2013Þ on information barriers.
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II. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we posit a simple model that allows us to consider how
the time-series process of TFPR should affect the cross-sectional disper-
sion of the ðstaticÞmarginal revenue product of capital and other variables.
Central to the model is the role of capital adjustment costs, and a one-
period time tobuild, inmakingoptimal capital investment decisions. These
adjustment frictions create links between the time-series process generat-
ing firm-level TFPR shocks and firm-level heterogeneity in the adjustment
of capital stocks.
A. Modeling Preliminaries
We begin by providing an explicit model of TFPR in the context of a
profit-maximizing firm ðsince we assume that establishments operate as
autonomous units, firms and establishments, for our purposes, are syn-
onymousÞ. A firm i, in time t, produces output Q it using the following
ðindustry-specificÞ constant-returns technology:
Qit 5 AitK aKit L
aL
it M
aM
it ; ð1Þ
where Kit is the capital input, Lit is the labor input, Mit is materials, and
we assume constant returns to scale in production so aM 1 aL 1 aK 5 1.
The demand curve for the firm’s product has a constant elasticity:
Qit 5 BitP2eit : ð2Þ
Combining these two equations, we obtain an expression for the sales-
generating production function:
Sit 5 QitK bKit L
bL
it M
bM
it ; ð3Þ
where Qit 5 A
12ð1=eÞ
it B
1=e
it b and bX 5 aX ½12 ð1=eÞ for X ∈ fK, L,Mg. For the
purposes of this paper, productivity or TFPR is defined as qit ; lnðQitÞ.8
The production function and sales-generating function are industry
specific; throughout the paper, the coefficients b and a are kept country
and industry specific unless noted otherwise. For ease of measurement,
we set e to be constant for all firms, industries, and countries.
A fact that we will use repeatedly is that, in a static model with no fric-
tions, profit maximization implies that the marginal revenue product of
an input should be equal to its unit input cost. For capital, this static mar-
ginal revenue product is given by
8 Throughout the paper, lowercase denotes logs, such that x 5 lnðX Þ.
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ySit
yKit
5 bK
QitK
bK
it L
bL
it M
bM
it
Kit
: ð4Þ
We will frequently refer to the marginal revenue product of capital
ðMRPKÞ, which we measure in logs:
MRPK it 5 log ðbK Þ1 log ðSitÞ2 logðKitÞ
5 logðbK Þ1 sit 2 kit :
ð5Þ
The marginal revenue products of labor and materials are defined sim-
ilarly.9
Our notion of productivity is a revenue-based productivity measure,
or TFPR ðas introduced by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson ½2008Þ. As is
common in this literature, we do not separately observe prices and quan-
tities at the producer level, and therefore, we can only directly recover a
measure of profitability or sales per input precisely.
This implies that all our statements about productivity refer to TFPR,
and therefore, deviations across producers in our measure of produc-
tivity, or its covariance with firm size, could reflect many types of distor-
tion, such as adjustment costs, markups, or policy distortions, as Hsieh
and Klenow ð2009Þ discuss in detail.
B. A Dynamic Investment Model
We now articulate a dynamic investment model that allows us to exam-
ine the link between TFPR volatility and dispersion in both the static mar-
ginal revenueproduct of capital and other variables of interest.Ourmodel
follows, and builds on, a standard model of investment used in the work
of Dixit and Pindyck ð1994Þ, Caballero and Pindyck ð1996Þ, Cooper and
Haltiwanger ð2006Þ, and Bloom ð2009Þ.10
Taking the structure in Section II.A as given, we begin by assuming
that firms can hire labor in each period for a wage pL and acquire ma-
terials in each period at a price pM. Both of these inputs have no addi-
tional adjustment costs. Thus, conditional on Qit and Kit, we can substi-
tute in the statically optimal amount of labor and materials. This leads to
a “period profit” ðignoring capital costs for the momentÞ of
9 Owing to the Cobb-Douglas specification, the marginal and average products are equiv-
alent in our setup. Hence, in the data wemeasure the average product and, using themodel,
interpret it as marginal.
10 The model used in this paper is a partial equilibrium model that can be rationalized
from a general equilibrium perspective only if there are no aggregate shocks and a contin-
uum of firms. Bloom et al. ð2012Þ discuss the implications of putting this type of model into
a general equilibrium framework with aggregate shocks vs. using a partial equilibrium
model.
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pðQit ;KitÞ5 lQ1=ðbK1e21Þit K bK =ðbK1e
21Þ
it ; ð6Þ
where
l5 ðbK 1 e21Þ

bL
pL
bL=ðbK1e21Þ bM
pM
bM =ðbK1e21Þ
:
Capital depreciates at rate d so Kit11 5 ð12 dÞKit 1 Iit , where Iit denotes
investment. These investment decisions are affected by a one-period time
to build and a cost of investment CðIit ;Kit ;QitÞ.
We employ an adjustment cost function composed of ð1Þ a fixed dis-
ruption cost of investing and ð2Þ a convex adjustment cost expressed as a
function of the percent investment rate. Formally,
CðIit ;Kit ;QitÞ5 Iit 1 CFK1ðÞfIit ≠ 0gpðQit ;KitÞ1 CQK Kit

Iit
Kit
2
: ð7Þ
Next, let qit follow an ARð1Þ process given by
qit 5 m1 rqit21 1 jnit ; ð8Þ
where nit ∼Nð0; 1Þ is an independent and identically distributed ði.i.d.Þ
standard normal random variable. This implicitly defines the transition
function of Q: fðQit11jQitÞ.
A firm’s value functionV is given by the Bellman equation
V ðQit ;KitÞ5 max
Iit
pðQit ;KitÞ2 CðIit ;Kit ;QitÞ
1bE
Qit11
V ðQit11; dKit 1 IitÞfðQit11jQitÞdQit11;
ð9Þ
and, thus, a firm’s policy function I *ðQit ;KitÞ is just the investment level
that maximizes the firm’s continuation value less the cost of investment.
Note that since there is neither entry nor exit in this model, there is
no truncation of the TFPR distribution.11 Thus, given the ARð1Þ struc-
ture above, the cross-sectional standard deviation of TFPR is
11 The absence of entry and exit is a consequence of the decreasing returns to scale in
the revenue equation ðyielded by constant returns to scale in the production function and
an elastic demand curveÞ and the absence of fixed costs, which make it profitable for any
firm to operate at a small enough scale. See Midrigan and Xu ð2014Þ for a discussion of the
role of entry and exit in a similar model.
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SDðqitÞ5 jffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
12 r2
p ð10Þ
ðsee Hamilton 1994, 53Þ.
C. Moments of Interest
In examining the data we will focus on a set of moments that can be
generated by the model, three of which warrant explicit definitions. For
ease of reference, we provide these definitions here.
The first moment is the dispersion in the ðstaticÞ marginal revenue
product of capital ðMRPK, as defined in eq. ½5Þ. Dispersion in MRPK is
defined as SDstðMRPK itÞ, where the st subscript indicates that the stan-
dard deviation is taken within industry-country s in year t. This will be
our most common specification, although at times we will use different
configurations ðindicated in the subscriptÞ.
We next define the computed volatility in the static marginal revenue
product of capital over time as
SDstðDMRPKÞ5 SDstðMRPK it 2MRPK it21Þ: ð11Þ
Third, the volatility in firms’ capital over time is defined as
SDstðDkÞ5 SDstðkit 2 kit21Þ: ð12Þ
It is important to note that the magnitudes of these three moments
are unchanged if we adopt an alternative specification of the model in
which each firm’s TFPR process has a firm-specific fixed effect, that is, if
m is firm specific. This result is established formally in theorem 1 in
Appendix A. At the heart of the result is the property that a different
constant term in the ARð1Þ results in a level shift in the process, and this
generates level shifts in the inputs ðK, L, and MÞ. These level shifts then
get canceled out when taking differences at the firm level.
D. Comparative Statics
We analyze the model using computation. Like Bloom ð2009Þ, we use a
model in which investment decisions are made each month ða period
in the modelÞ. Modeling decisions at a monthly level is an attractive ap-
proach, as the model incorporates the likely time aggregation embedded
in annual data.12 The results we report are in terms of what one would
12 This interpretation requires transforming the ARð1Þ process—which is quoted to re-
flect, and empirically estimated off, annual data—into its monthly equivalent. After noting
that the sum of normal random variables with the same mean is distributed normally, this
reduces to a straightforward algebraic exercise.
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see in annual data; that is, we aggregate up from monthly decision mak-
ing to the year.
Figure 1 examines the way SDstðMRPKÞ, the dispersion in the staticmar-
ginal revenue product of capital, changes as j, the volatility of TFPR,
changes. For r5 0, we can show that SDstðMRPKÞ5 ½1=ðbK 1 e21Þj. Thus
more volatility of productivity leads to higher-dispersion MPRK. This re-
sult is straightforward to show since, with r5 0, productivity is no longer a
state, and firms choose the same steady-state level of capital ðfor a similar
model, see Lucas ½1967Þ. Where r ≠ 0, we use the computational simula-
tions in the paper to establish the possibility that volatility increases mis-
allocation.13
To generate this figure, we use parameters estimated using US census
data as described in Section V. Parameters and details of computation
can be found in Appendix C. In the figure there are three lines that
correspond to the model with both a one-period time to build and ad-
FIG. 1.—MRPK dispersion and volatility: model simulation. Values used in this simula-
tion are e5 24, d5 10 percent, b5 1=ð11 0:065Þ, bK 5 0:12, bM 5 0:40, bL 5 0:23,
CFK 5 0:09, C
Q
K 5 8:8, l5 1, m5 0, r ∈ f0:65; 0:85; 0:94g ðcorresponding to the lines from
bottom ½0.65 to top ½0.94Þ, and j ∈ ½0:1; 1:4. We use themeans in the US census data to get
our b’s and use estimates of adjustment costs for the United States discussed in Section V.
13 For r ≠ 0, this problem becomes substantially more complex. The issue is that the sales
to capital ratio now depends on the correlation between K and Q. In this broad class of
models, whether investment is increasing or decreasing in volatility is ambiguous ðsee, e.g.,
Caballero and Pindyck 1993Þ. Whether investment is increasing in productivity is also
unclear: see theorem 27 in Pakes ð1996Þ.
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justment costs, but with different persistence parameters in the ARð1Þ
process. From top to bottom, these lines correspond to r equal to 0.94,
0.85, and 0.65, respectively.14 Note that, for any specification and any
level of r, as j increases, so does dispersion in the static marginal reve-
nue product of capital.
To further understand the pattern in figure 1, note that this disper-
sion reflects the optimal investment choices of firms facing different
TFPR shocks over time and, hence, different state variables. To make
the effect of this clear, note that if all firms had the same capital stock,
this graph would contain a series of upward-sloping straight lines out of
the origin. Yet ðfocusing on the solid black linesÞ the relationship be-
tween SDstðMRPKÞ and j is not linear and has a slope change in the
region of j5 0:5 for r5 0:94 and in a ðwiderÞ region around j5 0:6 for
r5 0:85. There is no readily discernible slope change in this range of j
for r5 0:65.
To see why this is happening, note that initially, as volatility increases,
firms will engage in more investment and disinvestment. Since greater
volatility leads to larger changes in TFPR, it is natural that firms respond
by altering their capital stock more frequently. However, past a certain
point, firms begin to reduce their response to TFPR shocks. This begins
as j approaches 0.5 for r5 0:94 and 0.6 for r5 0:85, while for r5 0:65,
the same pattern exists but is much more gradual.
At these high levels of volatility, current TFPR is a weaker signal of the
future marginal value of capital. Hence, firms respond less to shocks
today because those current shocks are more likely to be swamped by
future shocks. In the limit, where the TFPR process is an i.i.d. draw,
current TFPR provides no information about future profitability. Firms
would choose an optimal level of capital and stick to it forever, resulting
in no variance in investment across firms. Thus, the slope changes evi-
dent in the relationships in figure 1 reflect a flattening out of capital
adjustments to volatility.
III. Data and Measurement
A. Data
We employ multiple data sets in our analysis. Table 1 describes the tier 1
data. They consist of country-specific producer-level data from eight coun-
tries: the United States, Chile, France, India, Mexico, Romania, Slovenia,
and Spain. Each of these data sets has been used extensively in the litera-
ture, most commonly in the analysis of productivity ðsee, e.g., Tybout and
14 These three values of r represent the 90th percentile, median, and 10th percentile in
the US census data, respectively.
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Westbrook1995;Roberts 1996; Pavcnik 2002; Konings andVandenbussche
2005;DeLoeckerandKonings2006;DeLoecker2007;Goldbergetal.2009;
Bloom, Draca, and VanReenen 2011Þ.
The data sets differ in the time period covered and in how producers
are sampled. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the various data
sets. Below we briefly discuss the various tier 1 data sets and defer more
details to Appendix B.
United States.—The data for the United States come from the US Cen-
sus Bureau’s Research Data Center Program. We use data on manu-
facturing plants from the Census of Manufactures ðhenceforth, CMFÞ
and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers ðhenceforth, ASMÞ from 1972
to 1997. The CMF sends a questionnaire to all manufacturing plants in
the United States with more than five employees every 5 years, while the
ASM is a 4-year rotating panel with replacement, sent to approximately
a third of manufacturing plants, with large plants being overrepresented
in the sampling scheme. The final data set contains 735,342 plants over
a 26-year period.
An industry is defined as a four-digit Standard Industrial Classification
ðSICÞ code. Labor is measured using the total number of employees at the
plant. Materials are measured using total cost of parts and raw materials.
Capital is constructed in two ways. For the majority of plants, including
all plants in theCMF, capital ismeasuredusing aquestionon total assets—
be they machines or buildings—at the plant. For the remaining obser-
vations, capital is constructed using the perpetual inventory method, us-
ing industry-specific depreciation rates and investment deflators from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Capital, materials, and sales are deflated using theNBER–Center
for Economic Studies industry-level deflators into 1997 dollars.
Chile.—Annual plant-level data on all manufacturing plants with at
least 10 workers were provided by Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadis-
tica. These data, which cover the period 1979–86, include production,
employment, investment, intermediate input, and balance sheet vari-
ables. Industries are classified according to their four-digit International
Standard Industrial Classification industry code. The data contain 37,600
plant-year observations. The smallest number of plants observed in any
year is 4,205 in 1983.
France, Romania, and Spain.—Annual firm-level data onmanufacturing
firms for France, Romania, and Spain are obtained from Bureau Van
Dijck’s ðBvDÞ Amadeus data set and cover firms reporting to the local tax
authorities or data collection agencies for the period between 1999 and
2007. We selected three relatively large European countries at different
stages of economic development. The coverage for all three countries is
substantial in that we cover approximately 90 percent of economic activ-
ity in each of the three manufacturing sectors. For example, for France
in 2000, we record total sales of €739 billion, whereas the Organization
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for Economic Cooperation and Development reports total sales to be
€768 billion. This implies coverage of 96 percent of total economic activ-
ity in manufacturing. For Spain we find, using the same coverage calcula-
tion, coverage of 88 percent. The collection protocol of BvD is consistent
across countries. We focus on the manufacturing sector to facilitate the
measurement of TFPR. Industries are classified according to the two-digit
NACE ðrevision 1.1Þ code for all three countries. Our data cover firms that
are primarily active in sectors NACE 15–36. This leaves us with 391,422,
174,435, and 457,934 firm-year observations for France, Romania, and
Spain, respectively. The data include standard production data, including
sales, employment, investment, intermediate input, and other balance
sheet variables.
India.—Annual firm-level data on manufacturing firms were provided
by Prowess and are collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian
Economy. Prowess is a panel that tracks firms over time for the period
1989–2003. The data contain mainly medium and large Indian firms.
Industries are classified according to the four-digit PNIC ðthe Indian
industrial classification codeÞ. These data include sales, employment, in-
vestment, capital, intermediate input, and various balance sheet vari-
ables.15 The final data set comprises 30,709 firm-year observations.
Mexico.—Annual plant-level data on manufacturing plants are re-
corded by Mexico’s Annual Industrial Survey and are provided by Mex-
ico’s Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development. These data,
which cover the period 1984–90, include production, employment, in-
vestment, intermediate input, and balance sheet variables. The sample of
plants represents approximately 8 percent of total output, where the ex-
cluded plants are the smallest ones. Industries are classified according to
theMexican Industrial Classification ða four-digit industrial classification
systemÞ. The final data contain 21,180 plant-year observations. The mini-
mum number of observed firms in a year is 2,958 in 1989.
Slovenia.—The data are taken from the Slovenian Central Statistical Of-
fice and are the full company accounts of firms operating in the manufac-
turing sector between 1994 and 2000. We have information on 7,915 firms:
an unbalanced panel with information on production, employment, in-
vestment, intermediate input, and balance sheet variables. Industries
are classified according to the two-digit NACE revision 1.1 code.
B. Measurement
To guide the measurement of TFPR, we build on the model in Section II.
A and, in particular, rely on the sales-generating production function in
equation ð3Þ. In order to recover a measure of TFPR, qit , we need to
15 The Indian data do not report the wage bill separately from the number of workers.
We do, however, take care to appropriately deflate the wage bill.
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compute the values of bL , bM , and bK by industry-country. Profit maxi-
mization implies that for each input facing no adjustment costs, the
revenue production function coefficient equals the share of the input’s
expenditure in sales, or formally,
bX 5
PXit Xit
Sit
for X ∈ fL;Mg: ð13Þ
As mentioned before, we allow bX to vary at the industry level within a
country, thereby allowing the production function to vary across in-
dustries and countries. In practice, in order to obtain a robust measure
of these shares, we rely on the median of the expenditure share for labor
and intermediate inputs, in a given industry-country ðscÞ, or
bscX 5median

PXit Xit
Sit

for X ∈ fL;Mg; i ∈ sc: ð14Þ
To recover the coefficient on capital, bK , we use our assumption of
constant returns to scale in production, that is, oxax 5 1, such that
bK 5
e2 1
e
2 bL 2 bK : ð15Þ
In order to compute bK , we need to assign a value to the elasticity pa-
rameter, e. We follow Bloom ð2009Þ and set it equal to four. However, our
main findings are invariant to choosing different values for the elasticity
of demand in the range ½4–8.16
Finally, to compute TFPR, we simply plug in the coefficients obtained
above into equation ð16Þ below and compute for each individual firm in
a given industry-country pair:
qit 5 sit 2 bK kit 2 bLlit 2 bMmit : ð16Þ
For a small fraction of the industry-country pairs for which the sum of
the labor and material coefficients exceeds ðe2 1Þ=e5 0:75, and thus
would imply a negative capital coefficient, we proceed by using the rel-
evant country’s average coefficient. For the one country, Slovenia, for
which the average material coefficient is above 0.75, we rely on ordinary
least squares ðOLSÞ production function coefficients, effectively using
the average output elasticities.17 Importantly, this approach in inferring
16 Table D.6 in the online appendix presents these results.
17 Alternatively, we could estimate the output elasticity directly from production data. We
follow the standard in this literature and rely on cost shares to compute TFPR and thereby
avoid the issues surrounding identification of output elasticities ðin our case, across many
industries and countriesÞ.
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bK allows capital to have adjustment costs since it does not rely on a static
first-order condition for capital.18
To measure the sales-generating production function coefficients,
and subsequently TFPR ðqitÞ, we require a measure of firm-level sales
ðSitÞ, employment ðLitÞ, material use ðMitÞ, and the capital stock ðKitÞ. We
follow the approach tomeasurementdescribed inBartelsmanet al. ð2013Þ,
which uses data sources comparable to those we use. When measuring
the value of the capital stock, we either construct the capital series from
the investment data or directly observe the book value of a producer’s
tangible fixed assets. We deflate all output and input data with the rele-
vant country-industry-specific producer price deflators.
We provide summary statistics describing our data sets in table 2. In
panel A, we report the median number of workers and median sales and
TFPR growth. Panel B lists the various standard deviations that are of
direct interest for our analysis: dispersion in MRPK, dispersion in capital
and TFPR, and a simple measure of volatility given by SDðqit 2 qit21Þ.
As expected, the median size varies substantially across the various
data sets because of different data collection protocols.19 Productivity
growth varies across countries, and it is no surprise that Slovenia and
India are the fastest-growing economies. The dispersion in MRPK ranges
from 0.98 in the United States to 1.56 in Slovenia. The next section
examines the relationship between dispersion in MRPK and volatility, a
central implication of our model, in more detail.
IV. Reduced-Form Evidence
A. Main Results
We begin our analysis by plotting, in figure 2, the relationship between
the dispersion in MRPK and volatility of TFPR for the US census data,
with each dot on the graph representing a specific four-digit SIC code.
We start with the US census data since this is the richest data source we
have access to and the data set in which issues of measurement and sam-
pling frame are plausibly the least important. We find a striking positive
relationship between volatility of TFPR and MRPK dispersion.
To see if the relationship between MRPK dispersion and volatility of
TFPR holds up more generally, table 3 presents, for each of our tier 1 data
18 See De Loecker andWarzynski ð2012, sec. 2.AÞ for more discussion. Similarly, we could
use a value-added rather than gross output approach to measurement. Doing so does not
change the results. Table D.17 in the online appendix presents the results of our main
specification relying on value added–based production functions.
19 In table D.5 in the online appendix, we verify the robustness of our results to using a
common size threshold.
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sets, regressions of the dispersion inMRPK, on TFPR volatility, controlling
for industry fixed effects. The focus of table 3 is the set of country-specific
regressions, where the unit of observation is the industry-year. The last two
regressions pool the data, such that the unit of observation is the industry-
country-year.
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics across Tier 1 Data Sets
A. Medians B. Standard Deviations
Country Workers Ds Dq
Dispersion
MRPK Dispersion k Dispersion q Volatility
United Statesa 111 .01 .00 .98 1.78 .63 .35
Chile 19 .02 .00 1.22 1.92 .54 .29
France 8 .02 .02 1.28 2.04 .61 .19
India NA .06 .04 1.13 1.61 .67 .29
Mexico 141 .02 .02 1.40 2.13 .86 .39
Romania 5 .01 .01 1.38 2.05 .70 .39
Slovenia 4 .07 .03 1.56 2.51 .59 .40
Spain 8 .03 .01 1.48 2.00 .46 .23
Note.—Dispersion MRPK is given by SDðMRPKitÞ, and volatility is SDðqit 2 qit21Þ; i.e., we
compute dispersion across the entire data set.
a The median is computed for the US census data as the average of plants between the
48th and 52nd percentiles.
FIG. 2.—Volatility and the dispersion in MRPK: US plant data, 1972–97. The unit of
observation is the industry. The line is generated by anOLS regression on 188 industries, in
which the estimated slope is 0.73 ð0.08Þ and the constant is 0.57 ð0.03Þ, and the R 2 5 .3,
where the standard errors are in parentheses.
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For each of the countries, there is a positive, and significant, coefficient.
Notably, in the US census, we see coefficients of 0.76 ðusing plant-level
dataÞ and 0.68 ðusing firm-level dataÞ, both of which are significant at the
1 percent level. Since we observe no economically significant difference
between plant- and firm-level data using the US census, from this point
on, we use plant-level data in computing US numbers.
These country-specific regressions are consistent with the model pre-
diction that dispersion in the staticmarginal revenue product of capital, at
the country-industry level, should be positively correlated with the vola-
tility of TFPR shocks.
TABLE 3
Dispersion MRPK and Volatility
Country Coefficient R 2
Industry-Year
Observations
United States:
Plants .76*** .47 4,037
ð.04Þ
Firms .68*** .44 4,037
ð.07Þ
Chile .54* .13 55
ð.29Þ
France 1.03*** .28 167
ð.33Þ
India .61** .28 279
ð.17Þ
Mexico .19** .07 296
ð.07Þ
Romania .44*** .21 126
ð.13Þ
Slovenia .53** .09 108
ð.21Þ
Spain .56* .35 181
ð.33Þ
All:
Unweighted .55*** .67 5,326
ð.15Þ
Weighted .74*** .50 5,326
ð.03Þ
Note.—We report the coefficient of a regression of SDstðMRPKÞ against
volatility, defined as SDstðqit 2 qit21Þ, including year dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the industry level. For all countries, weighted re-
gression includes as weights the number of producers in a country-industry-
year observation. These cross-country-industry-year regressions include
year and country dummies and report standard errors ðin parenthesesÞ
clustered at the country level. Table D.15 in the online appendix reports
the regression coefficients for the United States using only variation across
industries. This is directly related to fig. 2.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Pooling across countries, we see the same pattern. The reported co-
efficients are 0.55, when the data are pooled in an unweighted way, and
0.74, when the weighting matrix accounts for the number of industry-
year observations in a country. Figure 4A below plots the dispersion in
static marginal revenue product of capital against volatility. While the num-
ber of countries is very limited, it suggests a positive relationship between
both variables.
An important element in these regressions is the measurement of
volatility. In table 3 we measure volatility by SDstðqit 2 qit21Þ. This allows
the shock process to vary over time but is not an exact replication of the
ARð1Þ process posited in the model. In what follows we assess the sen-
sitivity of these baseline results to alternative specifications of the TFPR
shock process.20
Table 4 takes alternative measures of the volatility of the TFPR process
and runs country-specific regressionsmirroring those presented in table 3.
The three measures used are SDsðqit 2 qit21Þ; an ARð1Þ measure, which
is the js term in the specification qit 5 ms 1 rsqit21 1 js nit ; and, finally, an
ARð1Þ specification in which we replace ms with producer-level fixed ef-
fects. In table 4 we refer to this last specification as ARð1ÞFE. The ARð1Þ
specifications impose the restriction that js is constant over time. To keep
our alternative measures comparable, we impose the same restriction on
our previous measure of volatility, SDsðqit 2 qit21Þ.21 These volatility mea-
sures are highly positively correlated. The correlation coefficient for any
pair of measures, for any country, exceeds .72 and is often above .9.22
In all regressions the coefficient on volatility is positive, and in all but
two cases—out of 24—the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level
or better. In addition, the magnitudes of the coefficients are compara-
ble across all specifications, although the ARð1ÞFE specification tends to
produce coefficients that are somewhat higher than the other two speci-
fications. This is likely due to some of the js variation being absorbed by
the producer fixed effect.
Overall, the results support the conclusion that the qualitative reduced-
form patterns observed in the baseline specification ðtable 3Þ are robust
to alternative specifications of the TFPR process.
B. Additional Implications
So far we have focused on the relationship between the dispersion in
MRPK and volatility of TFPR. Although this is the main prediction of
20 Note that the specification for our ARð1Þ process rules out aggregate-level shocks to
TFPR growth. However, a regression of changes in TFPR on country-year dummies yields
R 2’s between .001 for Mexico and .023 for Chile when running TFPR growth against year
dummies. Thus, there appears to be only a small aggregate component to TFPR change.
21 As a consequence, the results in table 3 ðat the country-industry-year levelÞ differ in
magnitude from those presented in table 4 ðat the country-industry levelÞ.
22 Table D.4 in the online appendix reports these statistics.
1030 journal of political economy
our model, there are a number of additional implications, at both the
individual producer and aggregate levels. We explore these below.
1. Individual Producer Implications
An essential prediction of our model is that adjustment costs in capital,
coupled with TFPR shocks, lead to differences in MRPK among produc-
ers. The model thus implies that once producers install capital, TFPR
shocks should manifest themselves in variation in MRPK across produc-
ers. In the absence of adjustment costs—including a one-period time to
build—producers could simply adjust their capital, and this would lead
to the equalization of MRPK across producers. To test this mechanism,
we run the following regression for each of our tier 1 countries:
MRPK it 5 g0 1 g1yit 1 g2kit 1 g3qit21 1 gt 1 gs 1 nit ; ð17Þ
where yit ; qit 2 qit21 is the “shock” in TFPR between t and t 2 1. From
our one-period time-to-build assumption, this shock has not been ob-
served when the firm makes its investment decision about capital stock
kit at time t 2 1. We also condition on lagged TFPR to make sure we
compare two firms with the same TFPR at t2 1 making the same capital
decision, and we ask whether their MRPK is different if they are hit by
different TFPR shocks yit . Our theory predicts a positive coefficient for
TABLE 4
Dispersion of MRPK and Volatility of TFPR: Robustness
Volatility Measure
Country SDsðqit 2 qit21Þ ARð1Þ ARð1ÞFE
United States .82*** .86*** 1.24***
ð.04Þ ð.07Þ ð.11Þ
Chile 1.48* 2.10*** .33
ð.65Þ ð.65Þ ð1.48Þ
France 1.73*** 1.75*** 2.55***
ð.41Þ ð.41Þ ð.61Þ
India 1.31*** 1.75*** 2.75***
ð.33Þ ð.39Þ ð.55Þ
Mexico .39* .41** .33
ð.17Þ ð.17Þ ð.25Þ
Romania .76*** .94*** 1.38*
ð.23Þ ð.36Þ ð.72Þ
Slovenia 2.73*** 2.47*** 3.47***
ð.41Þ ð.41Þ ð.69Þ
Spain 1.24*** 1.46*** 2.55***
ð.34Þ ð.44Þ ð.59Þ
Note.—We report the coefficient of a regression of SDstðMRPKÞ
against alternative measures of volatility, defined in the text. Stan-
dard errors ðin parenthesesÞ are clustered at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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g1. The null hypothesis, given by the static model, is no meaningful
dispersion in MRPK as a function of TFPR shocks between t and t 2 1.
Table 5 lists the estimates for g1 by country. In every case, in every speci-
fication, we observe a significant, positive coefficient on the capital coef-
ficient, g1, as predicted.
A further prediction of our framework is that a producer’s MRPK
should be mean reverting. We run a regression of MRPK at time t on
MPRK at time t 2 1 and obtain estimates of the ARð1Þ coefficient. This
coefficient varies by country from 0.73 for Romania to 0.90 for Chile.
The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level in all cases. Hence,
across all countries we find evidence for mean reversion in the MRPK.
That is, in the long run, the restriction of adjustment costs on capital
fades, and a firm’s capital level reverts to the time-invariant mean.23
TABLE 5
Additional Predictions: MRPK against Shocks to TFPR
Country Shock Shock ARð1Þ Shock ARð1ÞFE
United States 1.29*** 1.26*** 1.13***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ
Chile 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.04***
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
France 1.37*** 1.37*** 1.26***
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
India 1.32*** 1.32*** 1.16***
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
Mexico 1.07*** 1.07*** .67***
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.05Þ
Romania 1.31*** 1.31*** 1.12***
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Slovenia 1.65*** 1.64*** 1.48***
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
Spain 1.28*** 1.28*** .69***
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Note.—We run, by country, lnðMRPKÞ against the TFPR shock, capital,
lagged TFPR, and year and industry fixed effects. The TFPR shock is given by
yit ; qit 2 Eðqit jI it21Þ, where I it21 is the information set of producer i at time
t2 1; depending on the TFPR process, we consider that this contains lagged
TFPR and producer and year fixed effects. We suppress the coefficients on
capital and lagged TFPR ðthey are significant with negative and positive
signs, respectively, everywhereÞ and also suppress the fixed effects on year
and industry. The standard errors ðin parenthesesÞ are clustered at the firm/
plant level to account for serially correlation and heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
23 We run MRPK it 5 m1 rMRPK it21 1 nit by country and include year and industry fixed
effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm/plant level to account for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity. All estimates of r are significant at the 1 percent level.
Table D.14 in the online appendix lists the estimates.
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2. Aggregate Implications
In addition to the aggregate implication that the dispersion in MRPK is
strongly related to the volatility of TFPR, our model suggests two addi-
tional aggregate implications: The following moments, at the industry-
year level, are all correlated with volatility: ðaÞ the dispersion in the
change inMRPKand ðbÞ the dispersion in the change in capital.24Wepool
across all our tier 1 countries and run reduced-form regressions for both
these aggregate variables, measured at the industry-year-country level,
on volatility. We include year and country fixed effects and cluster stan-
dard errors by country. The regression results are shown in table 6.
We begin with the dispersion in the change in MRPK, SDstðDMRPKÞ.
Model simulations ðas described in Sec. II.DÞ indicate that the disper-
sion in the change in MRPK should be positively correlated with vola-
tility.25 In table 6, we observe a positive and significant correlation be-
tween volatility and the dispersion in the change in MRPK both within
the US data and within the pooled data across all tier 1 countries ðboth
excluding and including the United StatesÞ. While the degree of cor-
relation should vary with the persistence of the ARð1Þ process present in
each country, the positive correlation in the pooled sample is consistent
with the model prediction.
The second moment we examine, the dispersion in the change in cap-
ital SDstðDkÞ, has a strongly nonlinear relationship to volatility. Figure 3
shows the relationship predicted by the model using the same simulation
procedure as in Section II, where panel A presents this relationship for
the adjustment costs we will estimate for the United States in the next
section, and panel B also includes the case without any adjustment cost,
but preserving the assumption of a one-period time to build. The reader
should note the difference in the vertical scale for these two panels.
Figure 3 reflects the mechanism described in Section II.D. That is, the
flattening of the change in capital adjustments as volatility increases re-
flects the changing trade-off between the size of shocks experienced to-
day and the likelihood that they will be swamped by future shocks. This
holds for both panels A and B in figure 3.
To examine this in a reduced form, we interact the volatility coefficient
with a dummy if the volatility associated with that industry-year-country
observation is higher than the median for that industry-country. The
24 A related literature explores the responsiveness of productivity dispersion to the
business cycle. Kehrig ð2011Þ, Bachmann and Moscarini ð2012Þ, and Bloom et al. ð2012Þ all
find that productivity volatility increases in recessions. We find no economically significant
impact of recessions on the dispersion of MRPK, although, like Bloom et al., we see sales
volatility increase. Given that MRPK is the sales to capital ratio, this suggests that capital
input adjustments offset any effect coming via changes in sales. See fig. D.2 in the online
appendix.
25 See fig. D.1 in the online appendix. The line describing the relationship is essentially
straight.
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model prediction is that the coefficient on this interaction is ðweaklyÞ
negative. As can be seen in table 6, this coefficient is always negative and,
in the case of the United States and the all-country sample, significant.
C. Adjustment Costs in Other Inputs
Our model makes the stark assumption that capital is the only input that
faces adjustment costs, and our empirical approach builds on this as-
sumption. This is clearly a simplification of the data-generating process.
This approach is based on the implicit claim that, across the span of
countries and industries examined in this paper, capital adjustment costs
are first order as compared to the adjustment costs of other inputs. A
simple way to evaluate this claim is to examine the ðlogÞ dispersion in the
marginal revenue products of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs ðk, l,
TABLE 6
Aggregate Implications
Aggregate Moment Coefficient R 2 Observations
SDstðDMRPKÞ:
United States only 1.03*** .63 4,039
ð.03Þ
Excluding the United States .56*** .64 1,289
ð.07Þ
All countries .89*** .68 5,326
ð.04Þ
SDstðDkÞ:
United States only .13*** .31 4,037
ð.02Þ
Excluding the United States .07*** .62 1,182
ð.02Þ
All countries .12*** .76 5,219
ð.02Þ
SDstðDkÞ:
United States only .17*** .31 4,037
ð.03Þ
 f> median vol.g 2.03**
ð.01Þ
Excluding the United States .19** .63 1,182
ð.09Þ
 f> median vol.g 2.09
ð.06Þ
All countries .17*** .76 5,219
ð.03Þ
 f> median vol.g 2.04**
ð.02Þ
Note.—The coefficients are obtained by regressing each aggregate moment against
volatility using country-industry-year variation, where we include year and country fixed
effects. Standard errors ðin parenthesesÞ are clustered by country when pooled and by
industry when using US data.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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and mÞ. To do this we compute SDst ½lnðbX Þ1 sit 2 Xit  for X ∈ fk, l, mg for
each country. Table 7 shows the results.
Across all countries, dispersion in the marginal revenue product of cap-
ital is greater than that for any other input. Further, the order of disper-
sion is overwhelmingly in line with what one might expect: SDðMRPKÞ >
FIG. 3.—Model simulation: dispersion in the change in capital and volatility. Parameters
are as for figure 1: r ∈ f0:65; 0:85; 0:94g ðcorresponding to the lines from bottom ½0.65 to
top ½0.94 when j5 0:3Þ.
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SDðMRPLÞ > SDðMRPMÞ.26 Given these results, we proceed with themain-
tained assumption that capital adjustment costs are the most important
component of the adjustment costs likely facing many firms in making in-
put decisions.27
V. Structural Analysis
In this section we evaluate the ability of the model to capture the mag-
nitude of the degree of dispersion in the marginal product of capital at
the industry level across our tier 1 country data sets. We begin by eval-
uating a baseline specification of our model in which we assume that all
industry-countries have the same production technology and the same
adjustment costs ðwe use the US mean production coefficients, with the
adjustment costs estimated from the US dataÞ. In this simple version, the
only thing that varies over industries in the structural model is the ARð1Þ
process governingTFPR shocks. This specification is intended tohighlight
26 Moreover, we also find that the relationship of dispersion in MRPK and volatility holds
up in every data set ðincluding tier 1 and tier 2Þ, while for the MPRL and MRPM, this is far
from the case. In fact, we could not find any particular pattern ðeither a positive or negative
relationshipÞ across all countries between volatility and the dispersion measures for L and
M. Table D.18 in the online appendix lists these estimates.
27 Bloom et al. ð2012Þ estimate a structural model of adjustment costs in both labor and
capital using Compustat data on US firms. While the model of Bloom ð2009Þ is suggestive
of a similar extension in our setting, given that we encompass eight countries in our tier 1
data and 33 in our tier 2 data set, we have chosen to use a more parsimoniousmodel. In our
data environment, it seems to strike an appropriate balance between realism, insight, and
feasibility.
TABLE 7
Comparing Dispersion of MRPK to Other
Inputs’ Marginal Revenue Products
Input
Country Capital Labor Materials
United States .81 .63 .54
Chile 1.22 .93 .48
France 1.25 .79 .87
India 1.01 .87 .55
Mexico 1.19 .85 .51
Romania 1.40 1.17 .67
Slovenia 1.54 .98 .54
Spain 1.45 .93 .70
Note.—We compute the standard deviation of
the marginal revenue product of each input by
industry-year, and we report the average across
industry - years by country.
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the extent to which, on its own, the TFPR shock process can capture dis-
persion in marginal products.
Following this baseline specification, we explore the extent to which
using industry-specific production functions and different adjustment
cost specifications allows us to capture additional richness. Before get-
ting to these results, we first set out the elements in the structural esti-
mation of the model.
A. Estimation
We briefly discuss the estimation of the crucial parameters of our struc-
tural model, those that vary by industry—that is, the TFPR process—and
how we recover the estimates of the adjustment cost parameters.
The ARð1Þ TFPR process is specified as qit 5 msc 1 rscqit21 1 jscnit . Note
that the coefficients are country-industry specific. Estimation follows
the procedure described in Section IV and relies on standard maximum
likelihood estimation techniques to recover the parameters.
Recall that the adjustment cost specification is given by
CðIit ;Kit ;QitÞ5 Iit 1 CFK1ðÞfIit ≠ 0gpðQit ;KitÞ1 CQK Kit

Iit
Kit
2
: ð18Þ
We estimate v5 fCFK ;CQK g using a minimum-distance procedure very
similar to that in Cooper and Haltiwanger ð2006Þ. That is, we seek param-
eters that minimize the distance between the moments predicted by the
model and those that are found in the data. The moments we use are the
proportion of firms with less than a 5 percent year-on-year change in
capital, the proportion of firms with more than a 20 percent year-on-year
change in capital, and the standard deviation of the year-on-year change
in log capital.28
Denote the predicted moments from the model for an industry s in
country c as WcsðvÞ, found by solving for the firms’ optimal policies and
simulating the model forward for 1,000 months for 10,000 firms, and com-
puting moments based on the last 2 years of the simulated data set.29
These predictionsmay differ across industries, depending on production
28 Notice that according to the results of theorem 1, stated in App. A, these moments are
invariant to differences in themean m of the TFPR process, and thus we do not need to take a
stand on the presence of a firm fixed effect in the estimation procedure. However, we have
also looked at the model’s predictions using estimates of the ARð1Þ process that include a
producer fixed effect for the United States, and we find comparable results ðcontained in
table D.3 in the online appendixÞ.
29 We employ a very fine grid for capital stock ðof 3 percentÞ, since fixed costs are identified
from the absence of small changes in capital. With a coarser grid for capital stock, it is difficult
to identify small fixed costs. This comes at the expense of computational time, and solving the
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function coefficients bl , bm , and bk , as well as the TFPR process estimated
in the previous subsection. We then aggregate the industry prediction to
the country level by taking a weighted average of the industry-level pre-
diction, that is,
WcðvÞ5 1osNsc os
NscWcsðvÞ;
where Nsc denotes the number of producers in industry s for country c.
Thus, the country-level predictions arematched to country-level moments
on changes in capital, where the moments from the data are denoted W^.
We estimate the model’s adjustment costs using minimum distance
with a criterion function given by the usual quadratic form, with weight-
ing matrixW:
QðvÞ5 ðW^2WðvÞÞ0WðW^2WðvÞÞ: ð19Þ
As the moments in the data are similarly scaled, we pick the identity
matrix as a weighting matrix ðW 5 IÞ. We find the minimized value of the
criterion using a grid search.
Table 8 presents estimates of the adjustment costs by country, along
with the moments used to estimate the model. Three aspects of the table
are noteworthy.
First, the moments on the year-to-year change in capital differ substan-
tially between countries. For the United States, over 39 percent of plants
do not change their capital by more than 5 percent, while this number is
20 percent for Spain and 8 percent for Romania.30 Likewise, the share of
plants that vary their capital by more than 20 percent is 9 percent for the
United States, 73 percent for Mexico, but 52 percent for Slovenia. These
differences in the variation of capital translate into differences in the es-
timated adjustment costs by country, with the United States having rela-
tively high convex and fixed adjustment costs and Mexico having convex
adjustment costs that are at least one-fifth of those of the United States.
The large differences in moments on changes in capital are striking.
Beyond differences in adjustment costs, they also reflect differences in
patterns of aggregate growth for each of these countries and differences in
the data collection protocols for tier 1 data. For instance, Slovenia expe-
rienced a rapid increase in output over the time period we study ð1994–
2000Þ, but this is not the case for the US manufacturing sector from 1972
30 Note that data for Spain and Romania are at the firm level.
value function takes over a half hour. The total computation time required for a single 3-
gigahertz processor to complete the estimation and simulations reported in this section is
2,286,000 minutes ð1,587 daysÞ. The computational burden was significantly reduced via
parallel computation on a large computing cluster at New York University. For further details
regarding computation, see App. C.
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to 1997.31 Also, for some data sets, changes in capital are computed from
the change in the reported book value of assets, while for other data sets,
these are inferred from investment and depreciation. Presumably, these
differences in the reporting protocol will also lead to differences in the
measurement in the change in capital.
Second, for several countries—France, Mexico, and Romania—we es-
timate no fixed costs of adjustment ðbeyond the one-period time to
build, which is in itself a form of adjustment frictionÞ. In these countries,
even with no fixed cost of adjustment, the model predicts that fewer
firms would change their capital by less than 5 percent than what we find
in the data. Conversely, a zero convex cost of adjustment is strongly re-
jected. As the convex adjustment costs get closer to zero, the volatility of
capital rises sharply. Given the data, this allows us to conclusively reject
the absence of any costs of adjusting a firm’s capital stock.
Third, focusing on the United States, we obtain the following esti-
mates: fixed adjustment costs ðCFK Þ, 0.09; and convex adjustment cost
ðCQK Þ, 8.8. The fixed cost of adjustment is equivalent to 1.5 months of
output, while the convex adjustment costs are such that when a firm dou-
bles its capital in a month, this component of cost is equal to 8.8 times
the value of its investment.32
31 Since the standard approach to estimating adjustment costs we use, such as found in
Cooper and Haltiwanger ð2006Þ or Bloom ð2009Þ, matches moments from the steady-state
distribution, this type of model has difficulty dealing with aggregate shocks.
32 These parameters can be compared to those found in Bloom ð2009, table 3, col. 2Þ.
Using a sample of ðonlyÞ large publicly listed firms in Compustat, they obtain fixed ad-
justment costs of 0.01 and convex adjustment costs of 1.00.
TABLE 8
Adjustment Cost Estimates and Moments by Country
Adjustment
Costs Data Moments on Change in Log Capital
Country Convex Fixed Less than 5% More than 20%
Standard
Deviation
United States 8.80 .09 .39 .09 .21
Chile 4.10 .07 .19 .11 .28
India 3.46 .12 .29 .19 .30
France .21 .00 .13 .57 .57
Spain .74 .00 .20 .41 .59
Mexico 1.15 .22 .08 .73 .66
Romania .66 .03 .08 .61 .72
Slovenia .35 .00 .15 .52 .76
NOTE.—Standard errors were computed using the usual formula for minimum-distance
estimators. However, because of the large size of the data sets we employ, the standard
errors are of the order of 1  1023 or smaller, and so we do not report them. Adjustment
costs for Slovenia are based on a model with production function coefficients set to the
mean US coefficients ðsee the discussion in Sec. V.BÞ.
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To assess the fit of the model, we compute the sum of squared errors,
scaled by the sum of the squared “dependent” variable ðdataÞ. That is, if
the data are a vector x that is predicted by a variable x^, then we compute
S2 5 12
ðx2 x^Þ0ðx2 x^Þ
x0x
ð20Þ
as ourmeasure of fit.Thismeasureoffit is closely related to theuncentered
R2 measure of fit familiar from regression analysis. However, because our
model’s prediction does not come from a regression, but from a parame-
terizedmodel, nothing in the structure restricts S2 to lie in ½0, 1, though, by
definition, itmust be less than or equal to one. That being said, tomap our
measure of fit into a context equivalent to the R2, it is correct to interpret
S2 as the proportion of the observed data captured by the model’s pre-
diction, with the caveat that it is possible for this number to be negative.
B. Results
As noted above, our baseline specification assumes that all industries in
all countries have the same adjustment costs and the same production
technology. We take both from the US data: we use the mean US produc-
tion coefficients and US adjustment costs.33 Our objective in evaluating
this specification is to highlight the extent to which ð justÞ differences in
the ARð1Þ process can capture dispersion in themarginal revenue product
of capital, at the industry level, across a variety of data sets ðequivalently,
countriesÞ.
Table 9 shows the S2 measure of fit, comparing themodel prediction of
the dispersion in the MRPK to that observed in our various tier 1 data sets.
When we pool across all industry-countries, the S2 is 0.674, while if the
United States is excluded, the S2 is 0.879. This suggests that the model
does a good job of capturing the observed dispersion. It also highlights
the curious fact that the performance of this baseline model is worst on
the US data, despite being based on US numbers.
The US S2 is 0.223, as compared to 0.879 for all non-US countries.
The reason for this is that the US data employ a far finer industry defini-
tion than our other data sets. In the US data, firms are allocated to one of
188 industry classifications, whereas in the other data the number of in-
dustries varies from eight ðChileÞ to 52 ðMexicoÞ.34 This means that, when
33 Mean production coefficients are computed by taking the mean of the industry labor
and materials coefficients and then using these to compute the capital coefficient.
34 After we account for disclosure and basic data integrity ði.e., missing data, etc.Þ, the
numbers of industries by country ðdata setÞ are as follows: Chile, 8; France, 21; India, 20;
Mexico, 52; Romania, 21; Slovenia, 18; and Spain, 22. The United States has 188. This
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we impose mean production coefficients, we do so on industry definitions
that incorporate differing levels of aggregation. In theUnited States, where
the industries are finely defined, this means that some industries will have
firms that all use production technologies that differ markedly from the
standardfirmintheeconomy.Asaresult, thebaselinemodelcanhaveahard
time capturing the investment patterns observed in these industries when
it has to use the production coefficients from a “standard” firm.
The impact of industry heterogeneity in the US data is illustrated by
comparing specification 2 to specification 1 for the United States.35 Spec-
ification 2 adds industry-specific production coefficients to the model.
Once industries are allowed to vary in their production technology, the
TABLE 9
Dispersion in MRPK, S2 Measures of Model Fit by Specification
Specification
Country ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ
United States .223 .806 .806 .643 .820
France .892 .702 .899 .944 .651
Chile .994 .983 .987 .963 .785
India .984 .941 .964 .976 .596
Mexico .879 .813 .883 .908 .634
Romania .983 .923 .817 .702 .846
Slovenia .967 .774 .967 .984 .683
Spain .718 .627 .600 .530 .495
All ðexcluding United StatesÞ .879 .777 .820 .800 .640
All .674 .786 .816 .748 .696
Specification details:
All US adjusted costs X X
Own-country adjusted costs X
All 2  US adjusted costs X
1-period time to build only X
US average b’s X
Industry-country b’s X X X X
Note.—The unit of observation is the country-industry. Specifications are as follows:
ð1Þ All countries have the United States’ estimated adjustment costs and production co-
efficients equal to the US averages across industries; ð2Þ industry-country-specific produc-
tion coefficients ðexcept for Slovenia; see Sec. III.BÞ, country specific adjustment costs, and
industry-country-specific ARð1Þ; ð3Þ same as for 2, but with the United States’ estimated
adjustment costs for all countries; ð4Þ same as for 3, but with twice the United States’esti-
mated adjustment costs for all countries; and ð5Þ same as for 3, but with zero adjustment
costs ðother than the one-period time to buildÞ for all countries. In all specifications, the
ARð1Þ is estimated using TFPR computed using the production coefficients used in the
model specification.
35 In table 9, specifications 2 and 3 are equivalent for the United States.
merely reflects that the detail of industrial activity reporting varies across data sets. For
example, for the French data we observe the principal activity of the firm, a two-digit
industry code, while we also observe its ðpotentiallyÞ multiple four-digit industry codes.
However, we do not see the output and input data broken down at this level of aggregation,
which is standard in these data.
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US S2 increases from 0.223 to 0.806, reflecting the model’s increased ca-
pacity to capture investment patterns across a much wider range of in-
dustries.
As illustrated by the preceding discussion of the baseline results,
addingmore flexibility to the model can increase the extent to which the
dispersion in the data can be captured. To this end, we depart from the
baseline model and allow each country to have its own adjustment costs
ðfrom table 8Þ and allow each country-industry to have its own produc-
tion function coefficients ðspecification 2 in table 9Þ. Following that, we
investigate the sensitivity of this expanded model to changes in the ad-
justment costs: we impose US adjustment costs, twice the US adjustment
costs, and zero adjustment costs ðaside from the one-period time to
buildÞ on all countries ðspecifications 3, 4, and 5, respectively, in table 9Þ.
Prior to discussing results, we outline some measurement issues: Re-
call that we assume bl 1 bm 1 bk 5 0:75 ðgiven constant returns in the
production function and a demand elasticity of 24Þ. Given this, we
handle the data as described in Section III.B with one exception: In
the Slovenian data, the material coefficient is greater than 0.75 on av-
erage. As a result, a strict application of our procedure would imply neg-
ative capital coefficients for all Slovenian manufacturing sectors, which
we think is not plausible. To avoid having to omit Slovenia, an interesting
country in its own right, we use the mean US coefficients to generate all
Slovenian results in this section.36
Across specifications 2, 3, 4, and 5, there is little qualitative difference
in the capacity for the model to capture dispersion. This reflects the
good fit of the baseline model. That is, there is not a great deal of scope
for improvement in many cases. Perhaps most interestingly, the model’s
performance in capturing dispersion in MRPK is not dramatically al-
tered by changing the level of adjustment costs. A zero adjustment cost
reduces fit in most countries somewhat, but imposing twice the US ad-
justment cost does not have an economically meaningful impact. This
suggests that the presence of some capital adjustment friction is im-
portant but that the extent of the friction is not crucial, at least as far as
dispersion in MRPK is concerned.37 In the absence of any adjustment
36 Slovenia is interesting because of the volatility introduced by the transition process it
experienced during our sample time period. Using US production coefficients keeps the
specification consistent with the structural model, albeit in a way that restricts us to examin-
ing how Slovenian firms would behave if they had the production technology of US firms.
37 For other moments, notably the dispersion in the change in capital, the level of the
adjustment can make a significant difference. See table D.2 in the online appendix and, in
particular, col. 5 corresponding to the case of no adjustment costs. To examine the sensitivity
of the models’ predictions to the potential misspecification of the productivity process, we le-
verage theorem 1 and impose the j and r terms from an alternative productivity process allow-
ing for firm fixed effects, where we rely on various dynamic panel data estimators. Table D.3
shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of producer-level fixed effects in the produc-
tivity process.
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cost in capital, including time to build, the model evaluated under our
parameter values an S2 of zero ðunderpredictionÞ. Note that, when the
model overpredicts dispersion, it is possible for this S2 measure to be-
come negative.
VI. Cross-Country Analysis
The main source of variation that we have relied on thus far is cross-
industry variation within a country. Although our results suggest a pos-
itive correlation between dispersion and volatility in cross-country settings,
drawing a stronger inference is limited by having a sample of only eight
countries, each with different data collection protocols. In this section, in
order to provide auxiliary evidence that speaks to such a conclusion, we
exploit a larger cross section of developing countries for which we observe
a sample of firms for only, at most, three consecutive periods. To this end,
we rely on the WBES data. These data trade off greater cross-country var-
iation at the expense of stricter data collection protocols and a much
larger, within-country, sample of firms. As before, we apply our reduced-
form and structural analysis ðas carried out in Secs. IV and V, respectivelyÞ
on a large cross section of countries. We briefly introduce the data before
we present our results.
A. The WBES Data
The WBES data were collected by the World Bank across 41 developing
countries and many different industries between 2002 and 2006. Stan-
dard output and input measures are reported in a harmonized fashion.
In particular, the data report sales, intermediate inputs, various mea-
sures of capital, and employment for a 3-year period, which allows us to
compute changes in TFPR and capital. Out of the 41 countries in the
data, 33 have usable firm-level observations. The reason is primarily that
for many years and countries, the World Bank did not collect multiyear
data on capital stock.
To construct data on both TFPR and the change in TFPR, we need two
years of information on sales, assets, intermediate inputs, and employ-
ment; 5,558 firms across our 33 countries meet this criterion.38 The firms
in the final data are almost certainly not representative of firms in their
economies; for instance, the mean number of workers is 248. Thus, for
instance, the data tend to oversample larger firms. In Appendix B we
provide further details on sample construction and compare the firms in
our sample with the universe of sampled firms.
38 We also drop countries with fewer than 25 observations.
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B. Cross-Country Reduced-Form Results
We start by establishing the relationship between static misallocation
and volatility across countries, using a method similar to what we used at
the industry level. Figure 4B plots the volatility of TFPR against the dis-
persion of MRPK for our 33 countries in the WBES data. We find the
same striking positive relationship as we presented in figure 2 in Sec-
tion IV using US census data. Figure 4A shows the same exercise for the
eight tier 1 countries.
The solid black line in panel B shows the line of best fit, corresponding
to a regression in which dispersion is projected onto a constant and vol-
atility, where country observations are weighted by the number of in-
country observations.39 This positive, significant, correlation between dis-
persion and volatility is robust to specifications that use alternative weights,
industry fixed effects, and controls for firm size.40The relationship can also
be replicated using country-industry observations.
C. Structural Analysis
We now perform a structural analysis of the World Bank data, in the
same spirit as that conducted in Section V. We apply the same model,
with two alterations. We estimate an ARð1Þ process for TFPR at the coun-
try level, and we use the adjustment costs estimated for the United States
reported in table 8. We use US adjustment costs since we found in the
analysis of the tier 1 country data sets that the precise level of adjustment
costs appears to have little influence on the ability of themodel to capture
the dispersion in theMRPK.Hence, we examine the capacity of themodel
to capture dispersion using this simple specification.
To obtain country-level predictions, we aggregate predictions at the
industry level, using the number of producers in an industry as weights.
Moreover, since dispersion in MRPK at the country level includes vari-
ation in MRPK both within an industry and between industries, we need
to account for both these sources of variation when aggregating MRPK.
The results are depicted in figure 5. The countries in the World Bank
data are shown using unfilled circles, while, for comparison, the tier 1
countries are shown using filled circles.41 The horizontal axis measures
the model’s prediction, while the vertical axis measures the dispersion in
MRPK present in the data.
39 See the notes accompanying the figure for the coefficients and standard errors.
40 The last two specifications use firm-level observations. A complete set of results can be
found in table D.16 in the online appendix.
41 The tier 1 country data are aggregated in the same way as the World Bank data, and we
use a country-specific ARð1Þ process in the model simulation.
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FIG. 4.—Country-level static misallocation and TFPR volatility. Circles indicate countries,
where circle size for tier 2 data ðpanel BÞ is increasing in the number of firms per country.
The bold straight line is the line of best fit ðcomputed using OLS with a constant termÞ. The
horizontal axis indicates the value of the standard deviation of qit 2 qit21. The vertical axis
indicates the standard deviation in MRPK. The regression line for panel A is given by 1.01
ð0.23Þ1 1.02 ð0.66Þ  vol with an R 2 of .28. The regression line for panel B is given by 0.78
ð0.10Þ1 0.67 ð0.21Þ  vol with an R 2 of .31, where standard errors are given in parentheses,
and vol denotes our measure of volatility.
The model does quite well. The S2 for the WBES countries is 0.802.
This is comparable to the model performance reported in table 9 for the
industry-level data from tier 1 countries. When we treat the tier 1 country
data in the same way as the WBES data, we get an S2 of 0.906. Also, if any-
thing, the model has a tendency to overpredict the dispersion in MRPK,
suggesting that the dispersion observed in data is less than what might
be expected to be generated by firms operating in the United States, fac-
ing US adjustment costs, but otherwise equivalent ARð1Þ and technologi-
cal environments.
D. Volatility and External Measures
So far, our strategy has been to estimate volatility of TFPR and see how
this measure of volatility is linked to the dispersion in various economic
variables. We have shown that volatility varies across industries within
countries as well as across countries. Although it is beyond the scope of
this paper to develop a theory of volatility to explain why volatility varies
FIG. 5.—Country-level MRPK dispersion: data versus model simulation. The vertical axis
is data, while the horizontal axis is the model prediction. The unit of observation is the
country. Predictions are computed at the industry-country level and then aggregated to the
country level. Black dots are tier 1 countries. Unfilled circles are countries in the WBES
data. All predictions use industry-country-specific production coefficients, a country-level
ARð1Þ process, and the adjustment costs estimated for the United States in Section V. The
S2 for the World Bank countries is 0.802 and is 0.906 for the tier 1 countries. The solid line
is the 45-degree line.
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across different economic environments, it is only natural to ask whether
our measures of differences in volatility across countries are related to
features of these economies.
To this end we match the World Bank Doing Business Dataset ðhence-
forth the WBDB dataÞ with the WBES data and check whether volatility
is correlated with some of the survey questions in the WBDB data. In
particular, we examine whether countries with greater volatility also face
more frictions in contract enforcement—measured in terms of cost and
duration of contract enforcement—factors that would plausibly affect
the uncertainty faced by producers. Similarly, we also collected data on
the extent of natural disasters per unit of landmass and an index of po-
litical stability.42
When we regress volatility against the cost of contract enforcement
measure, the duration measure, and a constant, we find a significant—at
the 10 percent level—and positive coefficient on cost and an R2 of 7 per-
cent. Time to enforce is not significant, economically or statistically. This
suggests that countries that exhibit larger volatility are also characterized
by higher contracting costs. A regression of volatility on a constant and
natural disasters per unit of landmass also yields a positive coefficient on
political stability and is also significant at the 10 percent level. Given the
limited number of countries for which we have measures of volatility, this
seems as precise an estimate as one could reasonably expect. Interest-
ingly, the political stability index is not significant in any regression, al-
though the correlation does have a negative sign. When we run a regres-
sion with all our measures of the economic environment in a country
against volatility, we find, as before, that the cost of contract enforcement is
associated with significantly higher volatility. Moreover, the F-statistic is
significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that the combination of cost
and duration of contract enforcement, political instability, and natural
disasters does explain some component of the cross-country differences
we observe in volatility. In particular, this simple linear cross-sectional re-
gression leads to an R2 of 14.3 percent. While speculative, these reported
correlations suggest that there may be linkages between volatility and fea-
tures of a country’s operating environment that are worth investigating
further.
VII. Conclusion
The primary contribution of this paper is to establish the link between the
dynamic process governing TFPR changes over time and cross-sectional
42 The online appendix provides more details on the data and the analysis: sec. D.1
describes the data and variable construction. Table D.13 presents the regression results.
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measures of dispersion in the marginal product of capital. We have shown
that a parsimonious model of the TFPR process coupled with capital ad-
justment costs explains both the level and variation of the dispersion in the
static marginal revenue product of capital across industries within
countries and across countries. We do this by examining eight large-scale
country-level data sets, including the US census ðtier 1 dataÞ, and then
extend the analysis with data from the World Bank on a further 33 devel-
oping countries ðtier 2 dataÞ. The cross-industry findings are primarily
supported by the tier 1 data, while the cross-country findings are primarily
supported by the tier 2 data.
These findings suggest that producers in industries ðcountriesÞ that
experience larger “uncertainty” in the future operating environment ði.e.,
higher volatility in TFPRÞmake investment decisions different from those
of producers active in less volatile environments. This leads to different
levels of capital and output and, moreover, means that the welfare gains
from policies inducing reallocation of factors of production are likely to
be lower than otherwise implied by static models, at least to the extent that
the TFPR process is exogenous. Indeed, if one has the view that the pro-
ductivity process is an exogenous, or primitive, feature of the model, then
our findings suggest that, in an aggregate sense, the firms in the countries
we studied are acting much as the social planner in our model would have
them act ðassuming that the social planner takes the capital adjustment
costs as givenÞ. This suggests that there are few welfare implications for
differences in cross-sectional measures of ðstaticÞ capital misallocation
across industries or countries. On the other hand, if government policy
can affect the productivity process, then there may be significant welfare
dividends to policy interventions aimed at moving toward some socially
optimal productivity process. However, characterization of what this op-
timal process is likely requires a more subtlemodeling approach than that
offered here.
This raises the important issue of the specific sources of adjustment
costs and TFPR volatility, a topic on which we provide some suggestive
evidence but otherwise leave open for future research. In particular,
TFPR is not just technological in nature. Our measure of TFPR volatility
will capture changes in managerial and physical technology. It will also
capture year-on-year variation in the intensity of corruption ðand the
implicit tax thereinÞ, other aspects of the application of the rule of law
relevant to business ðsuch as erratic contract enforceabilityÞ, changing
regulatory frictions, environmental factors ðe.g., floods and other nat-
ural disastersÞ and the efficacy of infrastructure used to cope with them,
and year-on-year variation in markups and product market competition.
Many of these elements of measured productivity volatility may be ef-
fectively influenced by appropriate policy aimed at providing a stable
business environment.
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Appendix A
Proof of Invariance to Fixed Effects in Productivity Process
Theorem 1. Consider the dynamic optimization problem described by the
Bellman equation
V ðQ;K Þ5 max
I ;M ;L
SðQ;K ;L;MÞ2 pLL 2 pMM 2 CðI ;K ;L;M ;QÞ
1 bE
Q
0
V ðQ0; dK 1 I Þf ðdQ0jQÞ:
ðA1Þ
Let f ðQ0jQÞ be described by one of the following processes:
A. qit11 5 mi 1 rqit 1 jeit and
B. ~qit11 5 ~mi 1 r~qit 1 jeit .
Then, for any mi and ~mi ,
i. ðsit 2 xit jmiÞ5 ðsit 2 xit j~miÞ and
ii. ðxit 2 xit21jmiÞ5 ðxit 2 xit21j~miÞ, where x ∈ fl, m, kg.
Proof. The proof proceeds by ð1Þ showing that changing the constant in the
ARð1Þ amounts to a level shift in the ARð1Þ process, ð2Þ showing that the entire
problem is homogenous of degree one, ð3Þ using this to show that changing the
ARð1Þ constant results in a level shift in the inputs, and ð4Þ noting that these level
shifts get canceled out when computing differences at the firm level. We use a
series of lemmas to develop this reasoning.43
Lemma 1. Consider two processes A and B above. Process B is a level shift
of process A. That is, conditional on initial conditions and the history of eit ,
~qit 5 qit 1 logL, where ð12 rÞlogL5 ~mi 2 mi .
Proof. Starting with process A, increase qit by logL. Now, consider the evo-
lution of process B from qit 1 logL:
~qit11 5 ~mi 1 rðqit 1 logLÞ1 jeit
5 mi 1 ð12 rÞlogL1 rðqit 1 logLÞ1 jeit
5 mi 1 logL1 rqit 1 jeit
5 qit11 1 logL:
Hence, process B is a level shift of process A. QED
Lemma 2. A process determining the evolution of ~Q, where log~Q5 ~q, de-
scribed by B, is isomorphic, in terms of realizations of random variables, to a
process determining LQ, where the process describing the evolution of Q is A.
Proof. This is a corollary of lemma 1. QED
43 In both the theorem and proof, unless noted otherwise, variable definitions and
notation follow those used in the paper.
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The rest of the proof employs a transformation of the problem.44 Let
G 12a2b2cit 5 Qit and ð12 a 2 b 2 cÞgit 5 qit ;
since this is a bijective mapping, we can rewrite the TFPR process as
ð12 a 2 b 2 cÞgit11 5 mi 1 rð12 a 2 b 2 cÞgit 1 jeit ðA2Þ
and the sales function as
Sit 5 G 12a2b2cit K
a
it L
b
itM
c
it :
This transformation will allow us to exploit homogeneity properties in a trans-
parent manner. To keep notation consistent but distinct, let l12a2b2c 5 L. Note
the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ðSalesÞ.
lSitðGit ;Kit ;Lit ;MitÞ5 SitðlGit ; lKit ;lLit ;lMitÞ:
Before we proceed to the homogeneity of the value function, it is helpful to
establish that the static inputs, L and M, under processes A and B, are ðmulti-
plicativeÞ level shifts of each other. This makes it easier to state subsequent lem-
mas and manipulate the value function.
Lemma 4. If L*it and M *it are solutions to the system of first-order conditions
of static inputs, given Git and Kit, then, given lGit and lKit , lL*it and lM *it are so-
lutions.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that this is true for labor. As established in the
paper, the first-order condition is
bSitðGit ; Kit ; L*it ; M *it Þ
L*it
5 pL : ðA3Þ
Now, we need to show that, given lGit and lKit , lL*it and lM *it solve the first-
order condition:
bSitðlGit ;lKit ; lL*it ; lM *it Þ
lL*it
5
blSðGit ;Kit ;L*it ;M *it Þ
lL*
5
bSitðGit ;Kit ;L*it ;M *it Þ
L*
5 pL ;
where the first equality follows from lemma 3 and the last from equation ðA3Þ.
Hence, lL*it and lM *it solve the first-order condition. QED
Lemma 4 allows us to express everything that follows as functions of G and K
ðand I Þ, noting that, where relevant, a proportional increase in both leads to an
equivalent proportional increase in L and M. Note, in particular, that we can re-
write the Bellman equation as
44 Bloom ð2009Þ employs a similar transformation ðsee n. 23Þ.
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V ðG ; K Þ5 max
I
pðG ; K Þ2 CðG ; K ; I Þ
1 bE
G
0
V ðG 0; dK 1 I ÞfðdG 0jGÞ:
ðA4Þ
We now turn to establishing the homogeneity properties of the various com-
ponents of the Bellman equation, stated in theorem 1.
Lemma 5 ðPeriod profitsÞ.
Given
pðGit ;KitÞ5 SitðGit ;Kit ;L*it ðGit ;KitÞ;M *it ðGit ;KitÞÞ2 pLL*it ðGit ;KitÞ
2 pMM *it ðGit ;KitÞ;
then pðlGit ; lKitÞ5 lpðGit ;KitÞ.
Lemma 6 ðCapital transitionÞ. lKit11ðKit ; IitÞ5 Kit11ðlKit ; lIitÞ.
Lemma 7 ðAdjustment costsÞ. lCitðGit ;Kit ; IitÞ5 CitðlGit ; lKit ;lIitÞ.
Lemma 8 ðTFPR transitionÞ. Let process B be written in terms of g such
that
ð12 a 2 b 2 cÞgit11 5 mi 1 ð12 rÞð12 a 2 b 2 cÞlogl
1 rð12 a 2 b 2 cÞgit 1 jeit
and let the associated distribution describing the transitions of G be fBðGit11jGitÞ.
Similarly, let A be written as in equation ðA2Þ and let the associated distribution
describing the transitions of G be fAðGit11jGitÞ. Then fixing Git and Git11,
fBðlGit11jlGitÞ5 fAðGit11jGitÞ:
Proof. This follows from lemmas 1 and 2, noting that l12a2b2c 5 L. QED
We now turn to the value function, as defined in equation ðA4Þ. Let VAðG, KÞ
be the value function when the TFPR process is described by A. Similarly, let
VBðG, KÞ be the value function when the TFPR process is described by B. That is,
VBðG ;K Þ5 max
I
pðG ;K Þ2 CðG ;K ; I Þ
1 bE
G
0
VBðG 0; dK 1 I ÞfAðdG 0jGÞ:
Lemma 9 ðValue functionÞ. For any G and K, VBðlG ;lK Þ5 lVAðG ;K Þ.
Proof. We begin by defining I *A ðG ;K Þ as the optimal investment policy cor-
responding to VAðG, KÞ. We next define WAðG, K, IÞ as the choice-specific value
function under process A. That is, WAðG, K, IÞ is the value generated when
investment in the current period is set at I rather than I *A ðG ;K Þ. So
WAðG ;K ; I Þ5 pðG ;K Þ2 CðG ;K ; I Þ
1 bE
G
0
VAðG 0; dK 1 I ÞfAðdG 0jGÞ;
ðA5Þ
WBðG, K, IÞ is defined analogously.
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The proof proceeds by assuming that the future value function, VBðG 0; dK 1 I Þ,
satisfies the lemma and showing that this implies that WBðG, K, I Þ has the same
property. We then show that this, in turn, implies that the present value function,
VBðG, KÞ, satisfies the lemma. Hence, in a stationary context, the proof exploits
an inductive argument.
First, assume
VBðlG 0; lðdK 1 I ÞÞ5 lVAðG 0; dK 1 I Þ:
Now
WBðlG ; lK ;lI Þ5 pðlG ;lK Þ2 CðlG ; lK ;lI Þ
1 bE
lG
0
VBðlG 0; dlK 1 lI ÞfBðdlG 0jlGÞ:
Next, from lemma 8,
WBðlG ;lK ;lI Þ5 pðlG ; lK Þ2 CðlG ;lK ;lI Þ
1 bE
G
0
VBðlG 0; dlK 1 lI ÞfAðdG 0jGÞ:
Then from lemmas 5, 6, and 7 and the maintained assumption,
WBðlG ;lK ; lI Þ5 lpðG ;K Þ2 lCðG ;K ; I Þ
1 lbE
G
0
VAðG 0; ðdK 1 I ÞÞfAðdG 0jGÞ
5 lWAðG ;K ; I Þ:
Next, we show that this implies that the present value function, VBðG, KÞ, satis-
fies the lemma. First note that if I *A ðG ;K Þ5 argmaxI WAðG ;K ; I Þ, then lI *A ðG ;K Þ
solves argmaxI WBðlG ;lK ; I Þ since WBðlG ;lK ; lI Þ5 lWAðG ;K ; I Þ. Next,
VBðlG ;lK Þ5 max
I
WBðlG ; lK ; I Þ
5WBðlG ;lK ;lI *A ðG ;K ÞÞ
5 lWAðG ;K ; I *ðG ;K ÞÞ
5 lVAðG ;K Þ:
Thus
VBðlG ;lK Þ5 lVAðG ;K Þ:
QED
Lemma 10. Let feitg`t50 be a path of realizations of eit and let gi 0 and Ki 0 be the
initial conditions of g and K under process A and gi0 1 l and lKi0 be the initial
conditions under process B. Then, if fKitg`t50 is the path of capital under process
A, then flKitg`t50 is the path under process B.
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Proof. This follows from lemmas 1, 8, and 9. As before, let I *ðG ;K Þ be the
investment policy under process A. Now, consider the optimal investment prob-
lem under process B with capital state lK .
From lemma 9 we know that lI *A ðG ;K Þ5 I *B ðlG ; lK Þ. That is, if I *A ðG ;K Þ is
the solution when l5 0 ði.e., process AÞ, then lI *A ðG ;K Þ is the solution when
l > 0 ði.e., process BÞ. Hence, under process B, the path of the capital stock is a
level shift of that under process A. That is, if fKitg`t50 is the path of capital under
process A, then flKitg`t50 is the path under process B. QED
Together, lemmas 3, 4, and 10 allow us to compare SDðsit2 xitÞ and SDðxit2 xit21Þ
under processes A and B. With all else held constant, if sit, xit, and xit21 are the
realizations under A, then sit 1 logðlÞ, xit 1 logðlÞ, and xit21 1 logðlÞ are the real-
izations under B. Since constants will be canceled out in the computing of dif-
ferences, the theorem is established. QED
Appendix B
Data
We employ multiple data sets in our analysis. We classify these data sets into two
tiers, shown in table 1. Tier 1 consists of country-specific producer-level data
from eight countries: the United States, Chile, France, India, Mexico, Romania,
Slovenia, and Spain. Each of these data sets has been used extensively in the
literature, most commonly in the analysis of productivity ðsee, e.g., Tybout and
Westbrook 1995; Roberts 1996; Pavcnik 2002; Konings and Vandenbussche 2005;
De Loecker and Konings 2006; De Loecker 2007; Goldberg et al. 2009; Bloom
et al. 2011Þ. Tier 2 consists of the World Bank Enterprise Survey ðWBESÞ. We
discuss the details of each data set below. For a description of the measurement
of productivity, see Section III.B.
A. United States
The data for the United States come from the US Census Bureau’s Research Data
Center Program. We use data on manufacturing plants from the Census of Man-
ufactures ðCMFÞ and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers ðASMÞ from 1972 to
1997.45 The CMF sends a questionnaire to all manufacturing plants in the United
States with more than five employees every 5 years, while the ASM is a 4-year ro-
tating panel with replacement, sent to approximately a third of manufacturing
plants, with large plants being overrepresented in the sampling scheme.
Labor is measured using the total number of employees at the plant. Materials
are measured using total cost of parts and raw materials.
Capital is constructed in two ways. For themajority of plants, including all plants
in the CMF, capital is measured using a question on total assets—be they machines
or buildings—at the plant. For the remaining observations, capital is constructed
45 We use a version of these files that has been processed for productivity analysis by the
staff at the Center for Economic Studies at the US Census Bureau, and more information
on the construction of these data can be found in the productivity database files at the
Census Bureau.
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using the perpetual inventory method, using industry-specific depreciation rates
and investment deflators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the NBER.
Capital, materials, and sales are deflated using the NBER-CES industry-level de-
flators into 1997 dollars.
The original data set has approximately 3 million plants. However, only 1.8 mil-
lion of these have sufficient—that is, nonzero and nonmissing—data on sales, labor,
capital, andmaterials, required toconstructproductivity.Outof these,wekeepplant-
years for which we have observations in consecutive years, which allow us tomeasure
changes in productivity. There are several industries ðmeasured by the four-digit
SIC codeÞ that have a small number of plants. We drop industries that have either
ðaÞ fewer than 50 plants in any given year or ðbÞ fewer than 1,000 plants over the
entire sample period. The omission of these small–plant number industries has
little effect on our estimates, and they represent a limited number of plants in
the data; but dropping these small–plant number industries is essential for the
disclosure of our results. The final data set has 735,342 plants over a 26-year pe-
riod.
B. Chile
Annual plant-level data on all manufacturing plants with at least 10 workers were
provided by Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica ðINEÞ. These data, which
cover the period 1979–86, include production, employment, investment, inter-
mediate input, and balance sheet variables. The data were prepared for analysis
by INE: standardization of variable definitions across years, identification of en-
tering and exiting plants and adjustment for inflation distortions, and construc-
tion of capital stock variables. Industries are classified according to the four-digit
Industrial Standard Industrial Classification ðISICÞ industry code.
Output and input price indices are constructed at the three-digit industry
and obtained directly from average price indices produced by the Central Bank
of Chile. Data on nominal and real values of the various capital goods are re-
ported, including buildings, machinery, furniture, vehicles, and others and allow
the construction of price deflators. We directly observe total number of employ-
ees, total real value of production, total real intermediate input, total real book
value of fixed assets, and total real salaries. In total there are 37,600 plant-year ob-
servations reporting employment, with a minimum of 4,205 plants in 1983 and
5,814 plants in 1979.
The data were generously provided by Jim Tybout through a license at the In-
ternational Economics Section of Princeton University. See Pavcnik ð2002Þ for a
productivity study using these data.
C. France, Romania, and Spain
Annual firm-level data on manufacturing firms for France, Romania, and Spain
are obtained from Bureau Van Dijck’s ðBvDÞ Amadeus data set and cover firms
reporting to the local tax authorities or data collection agencies for the period
1999–2007. We selected three relatively large European countries at different
stages of economic development. The coverage for all three countries is sub-
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stantial in that we cover approximately 90 percent of economic activity in each of
the three manufacturing sectors. For example, for France, in 2000, we record
total sales of €739 billion, whereas the OECD reports total sales to be €768 bil-
lion. This implies coverage of 96 percent of total economic activity in manufac-
turing. For Spain we find, using the same coverage calculation, coverage of 88 per-
cent. The collection protocol of BvD is consistent across countries. We focus on
the manufacturing sector to facilitate the measurement of productivity.
The data include standard production data, where we observe total operating
revenue ðproductionÞ; total number of employees ðemploymentÞ; total material
costs ðintermediate inputÞ; total costs of employees ðwage billÞ; total fixed assets
and all the subcomponents of the capital stock such as buildings, furniture, ve-
hicles, equipment, and others; as well as other standard income statement and
balance sheet variables. The data also provide information on the firm’s legal sta-
tus, whether the firm is active, and its consolidation code. We use this information
to make sure that we include only firms actively producing in a specific industry
and use only their unconsolidated accounts to, for instance, avoid including to-
tal sales of a multinational across affiliates located in different countries. These
data are known to slightly underrepresent small firms because of the threshold
on either firm size or total number of employees ðsee Bloom et al. ½2011 and Lar-
rain and Stumpner ½2012 for more discussionÞ.46
Industries are classified according to the two-digit NACE revision 1.1 code for
all three countries. Our data cover firms primarily active in sectors NACE 15–36.
The manufacturing sector in each country leaves us with 391,422, 174,435,
and 457,934 firm-year observations for France, Romania, and Spain. Two-digit
NACE industry producer prices are used to deflate all nominal values and are
downloaded from EUROSTAT’s online statistics database.47
Access to BvD’s Amadeus was obtained through Princeton University’s Library
license. For recent work drawing on the Amadeus data, see Bloom et al. ð2011Þ
and the discussion therein.
D. India
Annual firm-level data onmanufacturing firms were provided by Prowess and are
collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. Prowess is a panel
that tracks firm performance over time. These data cover the period 1989–2003
and contain mainly medium and large Indian firms.
Industries are classified according to the PNIC classification code ðIndia’s in-
dustrial classification systemÞ, and firms report the principal industry activity at
the four-digit PNIC level.
These data include various production, employment, investment, intermediate
input, and balance sheet variables. In particular, we observe total sales, total ma-
terial costs, total fixed assets, and total wage bill. The data report both product-
46 In table D.5 in the online appendix, we verify that our results are invariant to imposing
a common threshold across all our data sets.
47 See http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupModifyTableLayout.do. The data
are found under “Industry, trade and services > Short-term business statistics > Producer
prices in industry.”
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level sales and total sales. We aggregate product-level sales to the firm level. The
Indian data do not report the wage bill separate from the number of workers. We
do, however, take care to appropriately deflate the wage bill. All nominal values
are converted to real values using two-digit producer prices. In total there are
30,709 firm-year observations reporting a wage bill, and there are 4,154 firms ac-
tive throughout the sample period.
The data are used in Goldberg et al. ð2009Þ and were bought under a license
by Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik. For recent work using the same data in
the context of production function estimation, see De Loecker et al. ð2012Þ; more
details on the data are discussed therein.
E. Mexico
Annual plant-level data onmanufacturing plants are recorded byMexico’s Annual
Industrial Survey and are provided by Mexico’s Secretary of Commerce and In-
dustrial Development ðSEC-OFIÞ. The sample of plants ðthe 3,200 largest manu-
facturing firmsÞ represents approximately 8 percent of total output, where the ex-
cluded plants are the smallest ones. For each plant and year, we observe the usual
data on production, input use, investment, inventories, and costs, as well as indus-
try codes and plant identity codes that allow us to track establishments over time.
Industries are classified according to the Mexican Industrial Classification ða
four-digit industrial classification systemÞ.
These data, which cover the period 1984–90, include production, employment,
investment, intermediate input, and balance sheet variables. In particular, we use
total value of output, total employment, total material costs, and total fixed assets.
SEC-OFI also provided price indices at the industry level for output and interme-
diate inputs and sectorwide deflators for machinery and equipment, buildings,
and land, which we used to convert all nominal values to real values. In total there
are 21,180 plant-year observations reporting employment, with a minimum of
2,958 plants in 1989 and 3,175 plants in 1984.
The data were generously provided by Jim Tybout through a license at the In-
ternational Economics Section at Princeton University. Tybout and Westbrook
ð1995Þ contains more details and contains an application to productivity analysis.
F. Slovenia
The data are taken from the Slovenian Central Statistical Office and are the full
company accounts of all firms operating in the manufacturing sector between
1994 and 2000. The original accounting data for the period between 1994 and
2002 were provided by Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Rec-
ords and Related Services.
We have information on 7,915 firms: an unbalanced panel with information
on production, employment, investment, intermediate input, and balance sheet
variables. In particular, we observe total sales, total material costs, total fixed as-
sets, total cost of employees, and total number of employees. All monetary var-
iables are recorded in Slovenian tolars and have been deflated using the con-
sumer price index ðfor data relating to capital stockÞ and a producer price index
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ðat the two-digit NACE industry levelÞ. In total there are 29,058 firm-year ob-
servations reporting employment, with a minimum of 3,355 in 1994 and a max-
imum of 4,788 firms in 2000. The sharp increase in the number of firms, in con-
trast to data sets with thresholds on firm size, reflects the sharp growth of Slovenia
and the manufacturing sector in particular. See, for example, De Loecker and
Konings ð2006Þ for a discussion on the entry of de novo firms during the transi-
tion period—which is covered in our sample period.
Industries are classified according to the two-digit NACE code for all three
countries. Our data cover firms primarily active in sectors NACE 15–36.
We would like to thank Joze Damijan at Ljublijana University for sharing the
data. We refer the reader to De Loecker and Konings ð2006Þ and De Loecker
ð2007Þ formore on the data and an application to production function estimation.
G. World Bank Data
The World Bank Enterprise Survey ðWBESÞ data were collected by the World
Bank across 41 countries and many different industries between 2002 and 2006.
Standard output and input measures are reported in a harmonized fashion. In
particular, we observe sales, intermediate inputs, various measures of capital, and
employment during ðand covering up toÞ a 3-year period, which allows us to
compute changes in TFPR and capital. Out of the 41 countries in the data, 33 have
usable firm-level observations. The reason is primarily that, for many years and
countries, theWorld Bank did not collect multiyear data on capital stock. Table B1
lists the countries we are able to use, together with the number of observations on
each country. The data are available from http://www.enterprisesurveys.org, ac-
cessed on December 15, 2010. Extensive documentation is available from the same
website.
The survey documentation describes the sampling universe as follows: “6. The
population of industries to be included in the Enterprise Surveys and Indicator
Surveys, the Universe of the study, includes the following list ðaccording to ISIC,
revision 3.1Þ: all manufacturing sectors ðgroup DÞ, construction ðgroup FÞ, ser-
vices ðgroups G and HÞ, transport, storage, and communications ðgroup IÞ, and
subsector 72 ðfrom Group KÞ. Also, to limit the surveys to the formal economy
the sample frame for each country should include only establishments with five
ð5Þ or more employees. Fully government owned establishments are excluded as
the Universe is defined as the non-agricultural private sector.”48
The survey used a stratified sampling procedure in which firms were sampled
randomly within groups on the basis of the firm’s sector of activity, firm size, and
geographical location. The structure of the sampling leads to an oversampling of
larger firms ðrelative to random sampling of all firms in the economyÞ. The exact
structure of the stratification varies by the size of the economy in question. We
have chosen not to do any sampling correction, preferring to maintain as much
transparency as possible as to the mapping from data to findings, being mindful
of the fact that we can use data from only 7 percent of the sampled firms in any
case and, most importantly, considering the absence of a well-defined criterion
48 “Enterprise Survey and Indicator Surveys Sampling Methodology” ðAugust 29, 2009,
3Þ at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/Sampling_Note.pdf.
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that could be used to guide any such correction. In any case, the results in the
paper are robust to controlling for differences in the size and industrial com-
position of firms across countries.
The firms in the data are drawn from the manufacturing, construction, ser-
vices, transport, storage, and communications sectors. As would be expected, the
precise industry composition ðdefined at the two-digit ISIC levelÞ varies by coun-
try. The majority of firms within a country were surveyed in the same year. The
TABLE B1
Countries in the World Bank Data Sample
Region and Country SDðMRPKÞ Firms
North Africa:
Morocco .75 376
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Benin .81 66
Ethiopia 1.31 211
Madagascar .93 84
Malawi 1.03 125
Mauritius 1.49 52
South Africa 1.29 199
Tanzania 1.65 58
Zambia .82 157
Central Asia:
Kyrgyzstan .53 94
Tajikistan .87 94
Uzbekistan .89 92
Middle East:
Syria 1.13 55
South Asia:
Bangladesh 1.28 134
Sri Lanka .96 114
Southeast Asia:
Indonesia 1.53 426
Philippines 1.06 278
Thailand .75 214
Vietnam .95 448
Central America:
Costa Rica 1.22 273
Ecuador 1.51 109
El Salvador .95 190
Guatemala .95 162
Honduras 1.10 203
Nicaragua 1.14 222
South America:
Brazil 1.00 85
Chile 1.40 745
Guyana 2.37 29
Peru .85 31
Europe:
Moldova .94 72
Lithuania 1.37 66
Poland .58 63
Turkey 1.87 36
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survey asked questions about activity in the current year and the previous 2 years.
Thus, the panel data aspect of these data, relating to activity in year t 2 1, comes
from the recollections and records of managers in year t.
To construct data on TFPR and the change in TFPR, we need two years of
information on sales, assets, intermediate inputs, and employment; 5,558 firms
across our 33 countries meet this criterion.49 For some of the countries in the
WBES data, a number of issues emerged in the calculation of TFPR. In particular,
labor use is typically reported as the number of employees or a wage bill con-
verted to the number of employees with no correction for hours worked. More-
over, sales and gross output data are not corrected for inventories, and the capital
stock is based on book values. These are standard data restrictions researchers
face using this type of data.
Sales are directly measured in the data. Hence, for many firm-years in the data,
we can compute TFPR directly. However, for some firm-years, we observe only the
firm’s wage bill and not the number of workers. To address this issue, we use the
median country-industry wage, ~w ðimputed from observations with both the wage
bill and the number of workersÞ, as a deflator and apply it to the wage bill to give
a measure of labor. That is, to compute Lit we use Lit 5 wLit=~w. In what is pre-
sented in this paper, we use this measure for all firm-year observations. Finally, we
rely on the book value of capital as measured by either total assets or net book
value. We experimented with both measures, and our results are invariant. When
we consider a measure of value added, we compute it by netting the sales variable
from the use of intermediate inputs.
Finally, we convert all relevant variables into real values using detailed producer
price and input price deflators where available. For the 33 countries covered in
the World Bank data, we rely on the World Bank deflators to convert all monetary
variables into US dollars. To do this, we use the World Bank’s measure of pur-
chasing power parity ðPA.NUS.PPPÞ. Note that we account for differences in the
rate of inflation across countries by using a year-specific measure of PPP. Since
TFPR is a ratio, these PPP conversions get netted out in many specifications, but
they are useful when, for instance, we use controls for firm size.
While there are over 41,000 observations in the data, only 5,558 have informa-
tion on capital over several years, which is needed to compute TFPR volatility. Ta-
ble B2 presents summary statistics of the data, where for each variable, the first line
refers to the data that we use and the second presents the data that we dropped
because of insufficient information to compute changes in TFPR.50 The dropped
observations are usually smaller firms with lower sales and fewer employees. How-
ever, changes in inputs ðsuch as changes in capital or laborÞ are comparable across
the data we did and did not use. Notice that the dispersion of TFPR is similar be-
tween the two data sets, with a standard deviation of 1.0 ðour dataÞ versus 1.2
ðdropped dataÞ, as well as the dispersion of the sales to capital ratio, which is 1.1
ðour dataÞ versus 1.3 ðdropped dataÞ. Thus, the sampling bias will slightly under-
49 We also drop countries with fewer than 25 observations. This has little effect on our
results. See table D.6 for the results based on the entire sample, i.e., for 36 countries instead
of 33. The results are virtually identical.
50 Summary statistics, analogous to table 2, can be found in table D.1 in the online ap-
pendix.
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state the level of TFPR andMRPK dispersion, but this effect is small relative to the
large differences in dispersion across countries.
Appendix C
Model Computation
The parameters we use are found in table C1. Parameters for the elasticity of
demand, depreciation rate, and discount rate follow those adopted by Bloom
ð2009Þ. The last set of parameters we need to fix are the j, r, and m terms in the
ARð1Þ process, which governs the evolution of productivity over time. We com-
pute the model for values of j between 0.1 and 1.4, which covers the range we
observe in the data. For r we pick three values, 0.65, 0.85, and 0.94. Finally, we set
m5 0. We also implicitly normalize the prices of noncapital inputs by setting l
5 1. More precisely, what we are normalizing is l, a function of these noncapital
input prices. The functional form of l puts structure on the relative prices of
noncapital inputs. Subject to this structure, normalizing l is equivalent to a nor-
malization of one of the noncapital input prices.
TABLE B2
Selection Bias Due to Missing Data in World Bank Data
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Observations
Log sales 7.0 3.1 5,579
6.7 3.3 51,043
Log value added 6.0 3.1 4,719
5.9 3.3 42,230
Log materials 6.4 3.3 5,579
5.2 3.5 46,642
Log capital 6.9 3.1 5,579
7.5 3.0 12,728
Log labor 5.2 2.9 4,715
4.8 3.1 23,696
Workers 284 874 5,579
145 1,010 50,891
Productivity 2.3 1.0 5,579
2.4 1.2 4,750
Sales to capital ratio .1 1.1 5,579
.2 1.3 12,528
Sales to labor ratio 2.9 2.2 5,579
3.1 3.2 37,918
Change in capital .1 .5 5,579
.1 .5 11,268
Change in labor .2 .7 4,626
.1 .6 14,360
Change in the sales to capital ratio .0 .7 5,579
.0 .7 11,017
Note.—The first row shows the data used in the paper, and the sec-
ond row indicates data that we dropped because of some missing ob-
servation.
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We compute the optimal investment policies for the value function in equa-
tion ð9Þ. We solve this model using a discretized version of the state space ðQit ;KitÞ.
Specifically, we use a grid of capital states ranging from log capital 3 to log capi-
tal equal to 20, in increments of 0.03. Moreover, we use a grid of productivity with
30 grid points, whose transition matrix and grid points are computed using Tau-
chen’s ð1986Þ method. The model is solved using policy iteration with a sparse
transition matrix ðsince there are 17,000 statesÞ. Using the computed optimal
policies, we simulate the evolution of a country, or industry, for 10,000 firms over
1,000 periods. We use the output from the 1,000th and 988th periods to compute
the reported results ðcorresponding to years t and t 2 1; recall that we interpret a
period as a monthÞ.
References
Bachmann, Rudiger, and Giuseppe Moscarini. 2012. “Business Cycles and En-
dogenous Uncertainty.” Technical report, Yale Univ.
Bartelsman, E. J., and M. Doms. 2000. “Understanding Productivity: Lessons
from Longitudinal Microdata.” J. Econ. Literature 38 ð3Þ: 569–94.
Bartelsman, E. J., J. C. Haltiwanger, and S. Scarpetta. 2013. “Cross-Country Dif-
ferences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection.” A.E.R. 103 ð1Þ:
305–34.
Bloom, Nicholas. 2009. “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks.” Econometrica 77 ð3Þ:
623–85.
Bloom, Nicholas, Mirko Draca, and John Van Reenen. 2011. “Trade Induced
Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Pro-
ductivity.” Technical report, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Bloom, Nicholas, B. Eifert, A. Mahajan, D. McKenzie, and J. Roberts. 2013. “Does
Management Matter? Evidence from India.” Q. J.E. 128 ð1Þ: 1–51.
Bloom, Nicholas, Max Floetotto, Nir Jaimovich, Itay Saporta-Eksten, and Ste-
phen J. Terry. 2012. “Really Uncertain Business Cycles.” Working Paper no.
18245, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
TABLE C1
Simulation Parameters
Parameter Comments
e5 24 Value also used in Bloom ð2009Þ
d5 10% Value also used in Bloom ð2009Þ
b5 1=ð11 6:5%Þ Value also used in Bloom ð2009Þ
bK 5 0:12 Mean value in US census data
bM 5 0:40 Mean value in US census data
bL 5 0:23 Mean value in US census data
CFK 5 0:09 Estimated using US census data; see Sec. V.A
CQK 5 8:8 Estimated using US census data; see Sec. V.A
r ∈ f0:65; 0:85; 0:94g Selected to fall within range of estimated values for the US census
j ∈ ½0:1; 1:4 Selected to fall within range of estimated values for the US census
l5 1 Scaling parameter that normalizes the price of noncapital inputs
m5 0 Normalization that has no effect on computed moments, by
theorem 1
dynamic inputs 1061
Bollard, Albert, Peter J. Klenow, and Gunjan Sharma. 2012. “India’s Mysterious
Manufacturing Miracle.” Rev. Econ. Dynamics 16 ð1Þ: 59–85.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Richard S. Pindyck. 1993. “Uncertainty, Investment,
and Industry Evolution.” Internat. Econ. Rev. 37 ð3Þ: 641–62.
———. 1996. “Uncertainty, Investment, and Industry Evolution.” Internat. Econ.
Rev. 37 ð3Þ: 641–62.
Collard-Wexler, Allan. 2009. “Productivity Dispersion and Plant Selection in the
Ready-Mix Concrete Industry.” Working paper, New York Univ.
———. 2013. “Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry.” Econo-
metrica 81 ð3Þ: 1003–37.
Collard-Wexler, Allan, and Jan De Loecker. Forthcoming. “Reallocation and
Technology: Evidence from the U.S. Steel Industry.” A.E.R.
Cooper, R. W., and J. C. Haltiwanger. 2006. “On the Nature of Capital Adjust-
ment Costs.” Rev. Econ. Studies 73 ð3Þ: 611–33.
De Loecker, Jan. 2007. “Do Exports Generate Higher Productivity? Evidence
from Slovenia.” J. Internat. Econ. 73 ð1Þ: 69–98.
De Loecker, Jan, P. Goldberg, A. Khandelwal, and N. Pavcnik. 2012. “Prices, Mark-
ups and Trade Reform.” Working paper, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
De Loecker, Jan, and J. Konings. 2006. “Job Reallocation and Productivity
Growth in an Emerging Economy: Evidence from Slovenian Manufacturing.”
European J. Polit. Econ. 22:388–408.
De Loecker, Jan, and F. Warzynski. 2012. “Markups and Firm-Level Export Sta-
tus.” A.E.R. 102 ð6Þ: 2437–71.
De Mel, S., D. McKenzie, and C. Woodruff. 2012. “Enterprise Recovery Following
Natural Disasters.” Econ. J. 122 ð559Þ: 64–91.
Dixit, Avinash K., and Robert S. Pindyck. 1994. Investment under Uncertainty.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Fisher-Vanden, K., E. T. Mansur, and Q. J. Wang. 2012. “Costly Blackouts? Mea-
suring Productivity and Environmental Effects of Electricity Shortages.” Tech-
nical report, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Fisman, R., and J. Svensson. 2007. “Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful
to Growth? Firm Level Evidence.” J. Development Econ. 83 ð1Þ: 63–75.
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C. Syverson. 2008. “Reallocation, FirmTurnover, and
Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability?” A.E.R. 98 ð1Þ: 394–425.
Goldberg, P., A. Khandelwal, N. Pavcnik, and P. Topalova. 2009. “Trade Liber-
alization and New Imported Inputs.” A.E.R. 99 ð2Þ: 494–500.
Hamilton, James. 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter J. Klenow. 2009. “Misallocation and Manufacturing
TFP in China and India.” Q.J.E. 124 ð4Þ: 1403–48.
Kehrig, Matthias. 2011. “The Cyclicality of Productivity Dispersion.” Center for
Economic Studies Paper no. CES-WP-11-15, US Census Bur., Washington, DC.
Konings, Jozef, and Hylke Vandenbussche. 2005. “Antidumping Protection and
Markups of Domestic Firms.” J. Internat. Econ. 65 ð1Þ: 151–65.
Larrain, Mauricio, and Sebastian Stumpner. 2012. “Understanding Misalloca-
tion: The Importance of Financial Constraints.” Technical report, Columbia
Univ.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1967. “Adjustment Costs and the Theory of Supply.” J.P.E. 75,
no. 4, pt. 1 ðAugustÞ: 321–34.
Midrigan, Virgiliu, and Daniel Yi Xu. 2014. “Finance andMisallocation: Evidence
from Plant-Level Data.” A.E.R. 104 ð2Þ: 422–58.
Moll, Benjamin. 2012. “Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-
Financing Undo Capital Misallocation?” Technical report, Princeton Univ.
1062 journal of political economy
Olley, G. Steven, and Ariel Pakes. 1996. “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Tele-
communications Equipment Industry.” Econometrica 64 ð6Þ: 1263–97.
Pakes, Ariel. 1996. “Dynamic Structural Models, Problems and Prospects: Mixed
Continuous Discrete Controls and Market Interaction.” In Advances in Econo-
metrics: Sixth World Congress, vol. 2, edited by Christopher Sims, 171–259. New
York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Pavcnik, Nina. 2002. “Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements:
Evidence from Chilean Plants.” Rev. Econ. Studies 69 ð1Þ: 245–76.
Peters, Michael. 2012. “HeterogeneousMark-ups and EndogenousMisallocation.”
Technical report, London School Econ.
Restuccia, Diego, and Richard Rogerson. 2008. “Policy Distortions and Aggre-
gate Productivity with Heterogeneous Establishments.” Rev. Econ. Dynamics 11
ð4Þ: 707–20.
Roberts, M. J. 1996. “Colombia, 1977–1985: Producer Turnover, Margins, and
Trade Exposure.” In Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries: Micro Patterns
of Turnover, Productivity and Market Structure, edited by M. J. Roberts and J.
Tybout, 227–59. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Syverson, Chad. 2011. “What Determines Productivity.” J. Econ. Literature 49 ð2Þ:
326–65.
Tauchen, G. 1986. “Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and
Vector Autoregressions.” Econ. Letters 20 ð2Þ: 177–81.
Tybout, J. R., and M. D. Westbrook. 1995. “Trade Liberalization and the Dimen-
sions of Efficiency Change in Mexican Manufacturing Industries.” J. Internat.
Econ. 39 ð1Þ: 53–78.
dynamic inputs 1063
